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 ME. MERCIER'S CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS. 77 of representativeness. Secondly, Mr. Spencer has unfortunately omitted in this passage to remind his readers of the distinction (prominent enough in earlier sections) between feelings peri- pherally and centrally initiated. This distinction of course traverses those that have respect to representativeness, and had Mr. Mercier remembered it he would not have thought Mr. Spencer unable to separate Blueness and Triumph ; for, when both are representative, Blueness is definitely representative of one sort of peripheral feeling, whereas Triumph (though, in its several elements, remotely) is not as a whole definitely representa- tive of any peripheral feeling. It would be well, I think, to make the distinction of Peripheral and Central Excitation fundamental, and ground that of Representativeness upon it. Blueness and Triumph would then appear to be separated not merely by specific difference, but as belonging to different orders. Thirdly, what I have just said must occur to any one who reads 480 by the light of 481. For we there learn that the chief value of Repre- sentativeness as a principle of the classification of states of consciousness, arises from its generally implying corresponding degrees of integration, definiteness and complexity. Now this is, no doubt, true in some sort of either peripherally or centrally excited feelings in classes severally, but not if we take them together. The power of sustaining the feeling of Blue in idea implies a greater integration of consciousness than does the feel- ing of Blue from immediate stimulus ; but is the idea of Blue to be compared with Terror in respect of integration and complexity ? To compare the two great orders of peripherally and centrally excited feelings with respect to definiteness seems merely inap- propriate : since in the former case definiteness is understood of comparison or relationality ; in the latter it means speciality of impulse or of the control of conduct. The explanations of Mr. Spencer's doctrine which I have now offered will, I hope, serve to parry Mr. Mercier's objections to it ; and, by way of a general excuse for the criticisms which I pur- pose making upon the latter author's classification of feelings, I may say that Mr. Spencer's classification seems to me, as far as it goes, a more natural outgrowth of his own system and of the principle of evolution. Mr. Mercier complains (p. 329) of Mr. Spencer's not explicitly expressing the emotional element of mind in terms of the correspondence between the organism and its environment (though he admits that this seems to be taken for granted), and consequently of classifying feelings "from a stand- point mainly subjective ". But this is hardly just. The terms Presentative-representative, Representative, Re-representative have an objective reference. They denote stages in the growth of feeling, accompanying the organisation of cognitions, during the extension and increase of the correspondence (between minds and the world) in space, time, speciality, generality, complexity, as set out in Psych., Part iii. Bearing this in mind, we shall easily detect