Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/576

 H. SIDGWICK, OUTLINES OF HISTORY OF ETHICS. 575 coin ' of virtue. Plato is always concerned (not merely in the Laics) to show that virtue is happiness ; but his contention is that the identity is only complete where virtue attains its full actuality in the wise man. One may find some opportunity for reflection in determining how far Plato ever fully identified virtue with wisdom, or how far he ever ceased to do so. Nor can pleasure be said to be ever so absolutely distinguished from good by Plato, so treated as co-ordinate with it, as Mr. Sidgwick suggests, at least if we make due allowance for the ambiguity of the word pleasure. And in the account of the cardinal virtues, there is hardly enough notice taken of the fundamental hypothesis of an order on which justice is based, the doctrine of a natural directing authority in reason, with a normal sphere of activity for each function. Lastly, it can scarcely be true (p. 51) that Plato held the knowledge of all particular goods to be implicitly con- tained in the supreme science of good, if that means (as explained on p. 54) that we can deduce the particulars of human well-being from a knowledge of absolute good. Mr. Sidgwick does excellently in pointing out the substantial agreement of ethical view between Aristotle and Plato ; and he is no less well aware that the Aristotelian ethics is full of super- ficialities and absurdities, and owes its importance in modern times mainly to the part it has played in giving the framework to later moralists. But he seems unduly to praise Aristotle for the inductive character of his method, a point which falls in with his disposition to find the analogue of modern induction in the Aristotelian eVer/ar/?}. It is doubtful induction to suppose a unity in the chief end of conduct : and when it is inferred that because a piper has a function, therefore man as man has one too, the conclusion only follows on the assumption that man is a member of an ordered system (Q. E. D.). Moreover the whole reasoning is only a paraphrase of Plato. Noting in passing that the rendering of e'ffs by ' ' tendency " seems as defective as that of Te^i/i; by "technical skill" is commendable, we proceed to notice the remarks that Aristotle does not distinguish in describing liberality between selfish and benevolent expenditure, but that he does recognise benevolence in his theory of friendship. It may be doubted whether " disinterested benevolence " is found even there : whether "altruism" has any place in the Greek theory of virtue. The distinction of the true friendship for good men from that of other kinds is not that the former is disinterested, but that it is founded on a permanent characteristic of the person, not an accidental or external relation. The aspect of virtue on which the Greeks laid stress was its self-regarding character : but the best of their sages always taught that the true self was least affected with the defects of individuality. Passing on from the ineffectual fluctuations of Aristotle between ideal morality and the laxity of ordinary judgment, Mr. Sidgwick traces the characters of the Post- Aristotelian Schools. He notes the