Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/485

 484 S. H. HODGSON : sciousness to which all existence is relative is not our consciousness, and that our consciousness is itself relative to consciousness in general " (p. 10). I must not omit to remark, that Mr. Dewey's own state- ments on this point are in contradiction with each other ; that according to him the individual consciousness now is, and now is not, identical with the universal. But as he is quite aware of this (p. 16), yet without considering it a conclusive objection, to insist upon it would be fruitless. To assume provisionally that two differently named things are different is no hindrance to proving afterwards that in some essential respects they are identical. But to begin by as- suming them identical, in hopes of showing the how after- wards (p. 17), is fatal to proving that they are so, because, under cover of assuming their identity only, it tacitly assumes what it has to prove, the existence of both as realities. Not even the august companionship of German transcen- dentalism could redeem such reasoning from logical perdition. It seems to have been the general term consciousness which has played havoc with Mr. Dewey's ideas. When he uses such phrases as a consciousness which is not ours, and to which all existence is relative, or speaks of an universal self or consciousness, or of an individual self or consciousness, he plainly implies more than consciousness in general or consciousness simply. He implies some conscious beings or agents in whom consciousness is seated. Consciousness in general and consciousness simply are terms which imply nothing at all with regard to the seat, or agent, or agency, connected with the consciousness. The consciousness is taken, when these terms are used alone, as a mere content, the content of the stream of consciousness as data of experi- ence. All further distinctions and conceptions must be derived from this stream of data, from consciousness in general or consciousness simply. As Mr. Dewey well puts it, they must be found " within consciousness " (p. 17), or again, in developing what he well calls " the nature of conscious- ness " (p. 14). But to abstract from the seat, or agent, or agency, of consciousness, as we do by using the terms consciousness simply or consciousness in general, is not to assert that they have no seat, agent, or agency, connected with them ; nor yet is it to affirm that the seat, agent, or agency, is individual ; nor yet again that it is universal ; all this must come after- wards, that is, by examination of the nature or content of consciousness. But Mr. Dewey tells us, in a passage already quoted, that English Philosophy must see that " conscious-