Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/479

 II. ILLUSOEY PSYCHOLOGY. By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON. ENGLISH Psychology and English Philosophy are both very good things, so long as they cleave to experience as their only basis and their only test. The endeavour to do so is usually and justly claimed as the characteristic mark of English thought ; and whenever a signal success in it is obtained, which by no means follows as a matter of course, then it is that our psychologists and philosophers always feel the most legitimate satisfaction. If ever there was a time at which it was necessary to hold fast this endeavour of cleaving to experience alone, under the pressure of seductive phrases, and the familiar use of am- biguous terms which cover tacit but unwarranted assump- tions, that time is the present, a time of renewed vigour indeed, but nevertheless chaotic, and fermenting with the elements of speculative systems as yet unorganised or at any rate unrecognised. Whatever speculations are put forward at such a period by competent writers, whether in psychology or in philosophy, as being based on experience alone, and belonging to the English experiential line of thought, deserve the most respectful attention and scrutiny. Even results which axe prim a facie paradoxical should not on that account be passed over as unimportant. If for instance we are told by a competent writer, that Absolute Idealism is not only a truth of experience but one attained directly by the method of experiential psychology, we should not allow r our astonish- ment to prevent our examining the arguments, by virtue of which English psychology attains the results of German transcendentalism without quitting the ground of experience. Experience is notoriously fruitful of surprises. And when the post of honour in two successive numbers of MIND has been conceded to the exponent of the result in question, it is high time that some one should endeavour, however humbly, to test its validity. I refer to Mr. J. Dewey's articles, " The Psychological Standpoint " in MIND 41, and " Psychology as Philosophic Method " in MIND 42. I will deal with these very briefly, taking them in order as they stand, but without recapitulat- ing their whole contents, which, in the case of articles so recent, would be unnecessary, seeing that they will doubtless