Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/424

 P. MAINLANDEE, DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER ERLOSUNG. 423 That such a state of " integration " as this is the absolute end does not, however, of necessity lead to the conclusion that it is a duty to promote this end. An optimist like Mr. Spencer may think it probable that " dissolution " (which comes to the same thing as a final "integration " so far as man is concerned), if not the end of the whole cosmical movement, is the end of each par- ticular cycle ; and may hold it a duty to co-operate with the evolutionary movement, in spite of its always being reversed. Yet, so far as the actual course of things is concerned, it is evident that Mainlander has just as good a case as the optimists. As Mainlander himself sees, the dispute between the optimists and the pessimists must be decided, in the last resort, by a direct consideration of the ends and impulses of human nature. What he holds to be the answer of all the wise, when the question is brought upon this ground, we have already seen. In his own vivid phrase : " Life is hell, and the sweet still night of absolute death is the annihilation of hell ". The deepest impulse of man, as of all other beings, is " the will to die," and the highest happi- ness attainable is in the thought of the cessation of existence. From this he draws the logical consequences. The promotion of social and political reform, although praiseworthy, is not an absolute duty. Those have greater merit who are impelled by pity for humanity to promote directly in others that " transforma- tion and kindling of the will," by the knowledge that " not-being is better than being," which culminates, not in mere indifference to death but in "the love of death". And, finally, the solution of the problem rests with the individual. The highest virtue, therefore, is absolute chastity ; for by it the individual, so far as he is concerned, solves the problem for the race. The Philo- sophy of Redemption does not commend, but neither does it venture to condemn suicide. It is better, Mainlander says, to remain in life in order to help in the redemption of the rest of the human race ; yet the sense of the worthlessness of life, and the longing for the repose of annihilation, may become too great for endurance (vol. i. 349-51 ; vol. ii. 218). All mankind, good and bad alike, are to be consoled by the knowledge that, for the indi- vidual, death is a final redemption. The philosopher who has dedicated himself to the service of truth alone cannot avoid the duty of proclaiming this. Mainlander traces his pessimism not only to the religions and philosophies of India, but also, like Schopenhauer, to Christianity. " Pure knowledge," he says, " is not the contrary but the metamorphosis of faith." On the theoretical side, he connects his own philosophy most closely with Christianity. Brahrnanism, because it asserts a unity "z're the world," seems to him to be most in error. For this pantheistic doctrine makes individual beings, which alone are real, mere instruments of the All. Buddhism is in error too, in that it affirms, by its doctrine of Karma, " the omnipotence of the individual ". This doctrine, however, although affirmed in a one-sided manner by Buddhism,