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 F. E. ABBOT, SCIENTIFIC THEISM. 411 priori of the advocates of ' innate ideas ' : his Critical Idealism with the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley. But the development of the Kantian position in the hands of Kant himself, as well as in those of his successors, is the proof that "phenomenism" is only incidental to his method. Knowledge, at the Transcendentalist's evaluation, is real knowledge knowledge of the real and Trans- cendentalism is just the explanation of the meaning of ' reality ' in knowledge. Thus most of Mr. Abbot's polemic misses its aim as against Transcendentalism, inasmuch as it proceeds through- out on the assumption of that absolute dualism in knowledge which it is the work of Criticism to break down. He speaks, e.g., of " the world outside of consciousness," though he is forced to admit that " whatever exists is intelligible ". Nor is his criticism self -consistent. He conceives the Idealism of Kant, on the one hand, as subjective or individualistic Idealism, as a reduction of human knowledge "to the petty dimensions of individual self- consciousness .... valuable only as to the priori constitu- tion of the individual's own mind " (p. 9), and contends that, as such, its only logical issue is Egoism or Solipsism. " All sequent subjectivism abolishes the universal, and leaves only the indi- vidual, a solitary, unrelated, incomprehensible Ego" (p. 48). The answer to this line of attack is simply that the self-conscious- ness in which Kant finds the centre both of knowledge and of reality is not the individual but the universal self-consciousness that his method is not empirical but transcendental. But Mr. Abbot has another view of the Kantian position, which inter- mingles curiously with that just referred to. On this view, the " Subjectivism " of Kant is in essence mere Sensationalism, " and it thus lands us ultimately in the scepticism of Hume " (p. 43). To this the sufficient answer is that the only escape from the " Subjectivism" which issued in Hume's scepticism is the objec- tive or Critical standpoint of Kant. The " revolution " which Mr. Abbot desiderates in philosophy is from the " subjective " to the " objective " standpoint. The latter is, he maintains, the standpoint of science. " All scientific inves- tigations are founded on a theory diametrically opposed to that of Kant : namely, that things can be known, though incompletely known, as they are in themselves, and that cognition must con- form itself to them, not they to it " (p. 14). " The time has come for philosophy to reverse the Eoscellino- Kantian revolution " (p. 14). The scientific method "demands with increasing emphasis from philosophy a theory of knowledge that shall justify it in all eyes ". The contradiction between philosophy, as hitherto pursued, and science is "absolute and insoluble". "The one is exclusively and narrowly subjective, .... the other is objective, in a sense so broad as to include the subjective within itself" (p. 11). " Science must be all a huge illusion, if philosophy is right ; philosophy is a sick man's dream, if science is right " (p. 36). "The possibility of the one is the impossibility of the