Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/350

 THE FINAL AIM OF MOEAL ACTION. 349 merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys ". The words " merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys " are added in opposition to the expressions " an end " and " desirable on its own account, without fee or reward," in order to explain their meaning. And indeed if this immediate satisfaction, the inner moral sanction, be not meant, what possible sense can there be in saying that " virtue is its own reward " or is desirable on its own account ? Further, upon close psychological analysis it seems to be impossible for a man to do a deliberate deed of virtue and not do it in part for the sake of the satisfaction of conscience. It seems impossible deliberately to cut off desire for all external and internal effects of an act. And we find that " common sense " does not demand it. On the contrary, men of stalwart moral nature are prone to resent purely altruistic or objective motives as an explanation of their deeds. The acts of greatest self-forgetfulness they try to explain as having been done at bottom for themselves. The biographer of Abraham Lincoln, of whom Emerson said that " his heart was as big as the world," tells a homely story of him which illustrates the healthiest moral consciousness on this subject. One day Lincoln was riding along a country road, when he noticed near by a pig making great efforts, but in vain, to get out of the mud into which it had sunk. Lincoln rode on a mile or two, then turned round, rode back, took planks and boards and lifted the unfortunate animal out. The exploit becoming known in the neighbour- hood, a friend remarked to Lincoln the next day : " You must be a very unselfish man, Mr. Lincoln, to have helped that pig out of the mud ". " Unselfish ? " replied Lincoln ; " why, I did it for my own sake, not the pig's ! " Whenever the question of duty is not clear and deliberation is required, the doer cannot help seeing that the highest motive is to gain his own self-respect. And such acts, although known to be done for the approval of conscience, would gain for the character of the doer, if not such intense admiration as is gained by deeds done with no thought of the inner satisfaction, still as deep trust. Besides, if we remember that the uncritical mind is always disposed to regard the deeper moral emotions as having their root, not in the mind itself, but rather in some external power, we shall see that the moral consciousness of men is in fact on the side of the inner sanction as the final aim of conduct. We find Christianity, for example, offering its consolations and urging men to seek the comforts of