Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/342

 THE FINAL AIM OF MOEAL ACTION. 341 this increase of pain might work to the general good. Also the sorrow of sympathy would be quickened. In short, in- trospection would decrease sensitiveness to pleasure (^ovrf) and its opposite, and increase sensitiveness to joy (%apa) and its opposite. These effects, however, would help to promote the general interests of society. It may be further argued, in favour of an objective aim, that introspection is an abnor- mal, unnatural direction of thought. And certainly it is true that relatively to other faculties introspection develops late and seldom to a high degree, although in every person it develops sufficiently for him to observe the inner se- quences of conduct. Indeed, whoever betrays evidences of remorse or of moral self-respect shows a capacity for moral introspection. The chief reason why it does not develop more highly in most men is because their will is bent almost wholly upon the attainment of external objects, and their intellect turns immediately in that direction. Moreover, in most men the will is not only attracted toward the external objects but repelled from the objects of internal moral obser- vation. It requires, however, only that the will be bent upon some object, which for its attainment demands intro- spection, and the intellect will show itself equally capable and obedient as before. An introspective turn of thought, therefore, cannot be objected to on the ground that it is an unnatural use of the intellectual faculties : it is only a higher use. But if not unnatural, introspection, it is argued, is at least for practical life morbid and dangerous. And surely this argument is well taken if by introspection is meant the attempt to bring before the imagination certain abstract conceptions and to picture these as realities, in order to excite the emotions in the contemplation of them. Such a habit of thought is certainly morbid and dangerous both to the individual and society. And certainly the inner moral sanction should not be made the end of conduct, if it would induce this habit, a habit that has been the most fruitful mother of all sorts of illusions, idolatries and vain specula- tions. Because of it, there has been no clear separation, in the consciousness of men, between what is really fact in the inner moral experience and what is mere inference. Facts, fancies and metaphysical explanations are all fused into one mass. In connexion with their inner moral life men are continually testifying to matters which in their very nature are incapable of being experienced. The result is that men of scientific habits of thought have been tempted to reject such testimonies entirely. They have suspected that all emotions arising from moral contemplation are based on