Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/340

 THE FINAL AIM OF MORAL ACTION. 339 right action has worth out of relation to human happiness, we must assume that such actions bring happiness to some other being than man. But this hypothesis is not scienti- fically justified, since the worth of right action, in cases of external failure, can always be sufficiently accounted for by the immediate satisfaction it conveys the doer. Kant's statement that a good will would shine like a jewel for itself, as something which had full worth in itself, is certainly true. But does a jewel shine except in relation to the eye that beholds, and has it worth except in relation to the delight in seeing it ? So with a right act. It shines and has full worth in itself, for the mere beholding of it in ourselves or another is a joy. A will, seen to be good, gives immediate delight. In this sense it has absolute worth. It is inde- pendent of all external success in the attainment of an external object or in the production of any future happiness in ourselves or in others. But to say that it has worth out of all relation to consciousness is, from an empirical stand- point, absurd. To remove this absurdity, resort must be made, as we have shown, to metaphysical theories which have no scientific foundation. And such resort has con- tinually been made. Metaphysical theories are brought in to justify the belief in the imperative nature of the moral law. But if such theories must enter into ethics, ethics ceases to be a science, a door is opened to scepticism. Now the advantages of gaining an inspiring moral view of life without transcending the sphere of inner and outer experi- ence, without resorting to " the thing-in-itself " or any extra- temporal existence, would equal the advantages gained by having a point of view which does not require for moral inspiration personal immortality or the immortality of the human race. But before we can gain such an ethical view of life, we must remove the chief occasion for transcending moral experience. This occasion has lain in the felt need of an explanation of the absolute worth of right action. Now, in the first place, the whole logical difficulty is removed when the relation of right activity to the immediate delight which it produces is borne in mind, and when the moral impulse, the love of right, is seen to lie in human nature itself. This delight is that in relation to which the deed always has worth; furthermore, it constitutes a proof that the moral impulse has its root in human nature itself. In the second place, the natural inclination to ascribe a transcendent signi- ficance to right action would be checked by setting up as the end of conduct the immediate satisfaction in doing right in the place of right activity itself.