Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/330

 THE FINAL AIM OF MORAL ACTION. 329 fectly moral man is one who loves the right above all things, and his making his own greatest happiness the final aim of conduct would be equivalent for men not perfectly moral to limiting their final aim to the satisfaction of the moral sense. It would be unallowable for them to add certain other pleasures, such as those which arise from health, friendship, the possession of children and the like, since the interests of humanity may demand a sacrifice of all these. Such pleasures might be enjoyed when they come, but they must be regarded only as the accidental accompaniments of a right life, only as that share which may return to one out of the universal fund of happiness. But the pleasure of the moral sense need never be forfeited except with life itself; the pursuit of it would always invest one with the precedent disposition to conform to the interests of mankind, such conformity being the only way of attaining it. It must be admitted therefore that if a man may make at all his own happiness the final aim of conduct, it can be only the happi- ness arising from one source the doing of deeds that tend toward universal happiness. He may seek his own happiness only to the degree to which he loves such deeds. Now if to that degree and from that source a man were to seek his own happiness, it is beyond dispute that he would thereby have predisposed himself to the interests of mankind. But if he were not a perfectly moral man by nature, he would not thereby gain his own greatest happiness ; he would be compelled to aim at something less. Egoism therefore does not furnish a final aim of life which satisfies the demands of the ethical standard. Perhaps it may seem that the mere adoption of the ten- dency to promote universal happiness as the standard of moral worth involves the acceptation of universal happiness itself as the end of conduct. It may seem that if any other end be adopted, it would be equivalent to setting up two final aims of conduct. To this, however, it may be answered in the first place that the psychological act of measuring the worth of every deed and aim according as it tends to pro- mote general happiness is not the same as aiming at general happiness. One might for some reason feel that this latter ought not to be aimed at, and yet at the same time might feel under moral obligation to conform oneself to that way of living which, if unhindered by external circumstances, would actually increase the sum of happiness. The act of conforming to the interests of society is not the same as making them the final aim ; therefore it would not involve a contradiction to justify some other aim than universal