Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/326

 THE FINAL AIM OF MOEAL ACTION. 325 Christianity gave definite answers to both these questions. " Lord, what shall I do to be saved ? " To be saved was the final aim of life for every man ; to obey whatever precepts Jesus gave was what one ought to do. And without doubt the secret of the vast power which Christianity has exercised over the thought and conduct of men has been the intensely personal character and the definiteness of its answers. It directed the scattered rays of a man's moral energy into one burning-point, and thus seemed to give to a man's life a new heat and light. Modern moralists, unable to accept the precepts of Jesus as the final authority or as the complete rule of life, have devoted almost their entire attention to an examination of the origin of moral sentiments, and to a search for the universal standard of right action. The result is that moral scepticism has been refuted ; morals is seen to have a common basis with other knowledge. Also a more or less satisfactory standard by which to measure the relative worth of actions and impulses has been found. But that act by which a man shall mould himself into all virtue at once has not been determined, indeed not even searched for. Impulses, self-love, benevolence and the like have been examined and their relative moral worth noted. So, too, the various objects of natural impulse, which men actually pursue, have been considered, and it has been shown that results morally desirable have ensued where not consciously aimed at. Nothing more definite has been done toward deciding what should be the final aim of life. And yet not because the Christian answer to that question continues to be accepted. Rather has the question itself been rejected. There has been a tendency to doubt that there could be a universal final aim of conduct. Wherefore, for the sake of the completeness of ethical science, and because of its practi- cal significance in life, we again put the question : What is the true moral end of life for every man ? and we attempt a definite answer. In our investigation we shall make but one presupposition, namely, that right and wrong are not merely fictitious qualities of conduct. We start with the simple assumption which, as Prof. Sidgwick says, " seems to be made implicitly in all ethical reasoning, that there is something, under any given circumstances, which it is right or reasonable to do, and that this may be known ". Accordingly the only objec- tion which can be made to the method we pursue is that th'ere is no such thing as moral experience. As to this ob- jection we are of Hume's opinion, that those who deny the reality of moral distinctions may be ranked among the disin-