Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/311

 310 F. H. BE ABLE Y : seems to be merely one of fact, and to have no other psycho- logical importance. 1 We have now surveyed, and to some extent have cleared, our ground, and the best course will, I think, be rapidl}- to go through the rest of our cases, and to ask in each if we require a specific activity of attention. After this and in conclusion we will deal with some particular difficulties. Let us first take the case where a sensation engrosses us, though not directly, and where yet we are not conscious of any activity. What operates here will be a connected idea ; for the idea engrosses, and what goes with it will therefore engross us also. We, I presume, are all agreed that ideas and that groups of ideas may interest. In what interest consists is a difficult question. It is I think quite certain that it consists to a large extent in pleasure and pain, but that it always consists in nothing else, or that pleasure or pain must always be present, seem both to me improbable. But for the purpose of this article I shall assume that what interests does so by means of pleasure or pain. Then, if an idea is pleasing, that idea may engross us, and if an indifferent sensation suggests the idea, the idea on its side will affect the sensation and cause it to dominate (cp. J. S. Mill, loc. cit. 372). How it does so is again a question that opens a somewhat wide field. We must content ourselves with the answer that it works by redintegration and also by blending. It is blending when, if two mental elements have got the same content, the intensities of both are more or less combined with a total or partial fusion of the elements. I should say that this process cannot wholly be reduced to redintegration, and whether its existence is compatible with the strict principles of the English school of "association," I do not know. It of course presents some difficulties in general, and raises a number of interesting problems. But, without dwelling on these questions, we may lay down the result that, if an idea engrosses, then any sensation which is connected with that idea may in consequence engross. And attention so far has appeared to consist in inter either direct or transferred ; an account which, we shall find, will hold good everywhere (cp. Waitz, L>'ltrl>i-Ji t G34-7). Let us pass on to the cases where we feel an activity. In 1 Some psychologists appear to l>e so taken Ijy tin- idea of our voluntary nin-cle- that, they seem at times to forget the exi-teiice of such thin.. glands and skin and mucous im-mln-anes. I AVI mid refer tin- reader ially to tlmse chapters in Dr. Take's Jnfli" m-> <>f tli< Mhi'l upon the muscles and the organic functions or see Carp'-ni.-i's .M< ntnl Physiology.
 * which deal with the action of the intellect upon the involuntary