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 H. STEINTHAL, ALLGEMEINE ETHIK. 233 Parliament and the last and finally, the institution of property, in which he is willing that great changes should take place. Property he regards, with Herbart, as a trust left to the indi- vidual by society, just as society leaves a man his own children. An excursus is appended on Socialism, which Prof. Steinthal thinks necessary in some form or other in order to dispose of the setting a price on a man's labour : a man has value ( Werth) which cannot be represented in money, but can only be acknow- ledged or esteemed. His socialism seems to be the rule 'To every one according to his needs '. But he will not hear of state-socialism : socialism must be the outcome of our associated life ; the state must in fact vanish, and society take its place (where again the state appears equivalent to mere government). And he is equally certain that socialism must come not by anni- hilation of existing morality, but by the "gentle course of his- tory," and it will require a change not in one country only but in all (p. 276). Many other special parts of the book might be made subject of notice e.g., the treatment of Eight in distinction from Morality under the head of the Idea of Eight (Part i.) or the analysis of Imitation (pp. 325 ff.) in the psychological part, most of which requires for appreciation reference to the Abriss der Sprachicissen- schaft. The advisability of calling a child's action in sucking a reflex (p. 322) is very questionable (cp. Wundt, p. 412). The chief value of the book, then, taking it as a whole, lies in Prof. Steinthal's insistence on the spiritual character of morality, though how the spirit itself arises in his system it is not easy to discover from the Ethics itself. Quite apart from the defect of formality in the treatment, the intelligible character of moral actions is a truth which is always being forgotten, because morality so palpably implies events. And this truth leads on to what must be considered another truth, the conception of the objective spirit. The value of these truths is not diminished by their not being original : in particular, can this objective spirit be distinguished from the Absolute Spirit (rejected by Prof. Steinthal) as it is understood by those theories which conceive it most philosophically ? With them it has national characters and his- torical development, and the conception of humanity is regarded (e.g., by Prof. Green) as meaningless except as exhibited in indi- viduals and societies. S. ALEXANDEB.