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 230 CRITICAL NOTICES : On this depends the notion of Duty : it is the intelligible charac- ter of man to perfect himself into the ideal reality which he acquires as moving freely in this atmosphere (p. 438). From. this root spring the particular duties : (1) self-respect with humility, (2) self-maintenance and self-devotion, (3) self-regard and regard for the community. This relation is otherwise ex- pressed as the relation of the / and the We. The / is the individual bearer of the objective spirit represented by We. In this sense of the Ego, it is the character as expressing the power of ethical rules. Without detailed inquiry, we may raise some questions upon Prof. Steinthal's general theory of morality. The " formal feelings " are a kind of " moral sense " only divested of the adventitious and arbitrary character of the moral sense, and objective, both as constituting their object and as universal. There can be no doubt there is a certain feeling of " satisfaction or dissatisfaction " (p. 48), connected with the unity of a moral act the feeling of approbation or the reverse : but is this a sufficient account of the nature of moral judgments ? In the first place, similar feelings are present in logical judgments, and may be called a formal feeling of truth (cp. Wundt, Phy*. Psych., ii. 347). Prof. Steinthal denies this (p. 40). He speaks of such feelings arising at the hearing of an unproved proposition, or of a given proof, but regards them merely as a kind of scientific tact. But, it may be urged, the " logical feeling " also exists as a kind of object-making feeling, a sense of logical propriety which almost impels the mind to take the next step in discovery, and such an intellectual sense is behind most theories of the develop- ment of ideas. And again is it not a moral " tact " which is also the guide in ordinary judgments of actions ? Prof. Steinthal's view of the relation of moral and logical judgment (Beurthettung) is indeed very difficult to apprehend precisely ; for instance, the latter (i.e., the answer to the question, Is a cognition true?) is distinguished from the former or from aesthetic judgment, as being without feeling (p. 39). But in Part iv. correct knowledge is declared to be true when it is the product of the moral impulse, and therefore would seem to be connected with a formal feeling (p. 412). Unless we are willing also to regard logical judgment as identical with logical sense, the theory of formal feeling hardly shows us more than that moral relations appear in feeling as a sense of satisfaction. The greatest difficulty in Prof. Steinthal's theory is in his appa- rent separation of the moral character of actions, and therefore of the formal feeling, from the "pathological feelings". The moral relations or Ideas thus become formal and abstract : they seem to be something besides the other relations between the elements of action. Now the beauty of a statue cannot be a mere relation of form, but implies a sensuous vehicle of the form, and the beauty is not imposed upon this (as we gather from p. 435), but