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 H. STEINTHAL, ALLGEMEINE ETHIK. 275 telling paragraphs of book iii. chap. 2. But he seems to know of no Utilitarianism which, accepting substantially his own rationalistic view of the basis of morality, contends for a purely hedonistic criterion. M. Beaussire's exposition of his own view of the criterion seems to fail a little in definiteness and incisive- ness for want of an opponent or rather of an opponent with whom he would have any common principles as a basis for argument. In a second edition, M. Beaussire could not do better than measure swords with Prof. Sidgwick. At present, his book is to be welcomed as a valuable contribution towards that recon- ciliation between an "Intuitional " view of duty and a Utilitarian view of the moral criterion which Prof. Sidgwick has attempted on other lines. Not unworthy of comparison with the Methods of Ethics in literary form, inferior to it in exactness of thought and expression, in argumentative power and unphilosophic thorough- ness, M. Beaussire's work is, as I venture to think, far more happy and consistent in its actual solution of the problem. 1 H. EASHDALL. Allgemeine Ethik, von Dr. H. STEINTHAL, a. o. Prof, fur Allge- rneine Sprachwissenschaft, Corresp. Mitglied der Kgl. Ges. d. Wissensch. zu Upsala. Berlin : Georg Eeimer, 1885. Pp. xx., 458. Prof. Steinthal's General Ethics is the fulfilment of a hope thrown out at the end of his Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft, the well-known work on the Science of Language, of which a notice appeared in MIND 33. There are many signs in Germany of a revived in- terest in Ethics, due to the prevalence of the strictly mechanical way of thinking, which, while attracting some, seems to impress upon others only more strongly the old distinction of nature and practice. The problem of Ethics, Prof. Steinthal conceives to be ' ' how to preserve the idealism of character, with full recognition of the mechanical world " (p. 18). We need an Ethics which shall be in the mechanical world, but not of it. This need, and the imminence of social changes in the moral conceptions of property and the family, supply an interest to systematic Ethics which they have not had before. The previous lack of interest he attributes to two causes : partly, the strong ethical affinities of the great national literature have dispensed with explicit ethical 1 The limits of this notice do not permit of criticism on points of detail, on many of which I should disagree with the writer. One of the most conspicuous features of M. Beaussire's system is his very sharp distinction between duties proper and acts which it is good to perform (pp. 71, 169, 182, 192-3, 240-1, 279). He is in fact an ardent believer in " works of superero- gation ". The basis of the distinction seems to be found simply in the un- analysed affirmation of the ordinary moral consciousness. The question seems to desiderate deeper treatment than is here accorded to it.