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 A. SETH, SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY. 271 Kant not for the first time gets somewhat hard measure from Prof. Seth. However ready to acknowledge his large manner in comparison with Eeid's, the lecturer is no sooner embarked upon an examination of the Critical Philosophy than he finds (like Dr. Hutchison Stirling) so much to except to in its fundamental positions as to side rather, in the end, by preference with the modest Philosophy of Common Sense. Though refusing to accept the home-grown product under its name of Natural Dualism (which, of course, brings back the "two-substance theory" in an aggravated form), he has, apparently, little or no objection to it under its other guise of Natural Eealism. On the other hand, Kant's categories are, after some consideration, pro- nounced "useless because they simply do over again what is already sufficiently done in the objects themselves " (p. 140) ; as, again, it is claimed for Experience that, so far from being identifiable with mere sensation or contingency, it "yields to the knower objects and relations of objects which are, to begin with, just what the categories are supposed afterwards to make them " (p. 142). Later on, in the fifth lecture, the Scottish philosophy is expressly congratulated upon its escape from the dangers of Kant's subjectivism " by taking up the broad position that while the prin- ciples in question [pure percepts of space and time and categories] are referable to the constitution of our nature, our nature is, in respect of them, in complete harmony with the nature of things" (p. 157). And even in comparison with the method and achieve- ment of Hegel, it is suggested, in the last lecture of all, that the Scottish procedure may yet lead to a more satisfactory determina- tion of the ultimate questions of human concern. This suggestion is to receive further development in the coining second course of lectures, which may also give the best occasion for considering what is here said on the help to be meanwhile sought from Hegel towards that end ; but as between Kant, on the one hand, and Keid, with the truer upholders (than Hamilton) of the Scottish tradition "writers like Prof. Calderwood, Prof. Flint and Dr. M'Cosh of Princeton" (p. 183) on the other, it may be asked whether the making of such round assertions about reality, object and the like, as data of direct experience, does not come perilously near to abandoning the philosophic task altogether. Prof. Seth, like Reid before him, makes no difficulty about surrendering the secondary qualities of matter to the relativist, let straightforward experience say of them what it likes, but would draw the line, for perception, at Aristotle's ' common sensibles,' and speaks of these as an absolute directly apprehensible by "reason in sense'' (p. 154). Why, though ' common,' should they have an absolute objective character ascribed to them as against Kant's subjectivist interpretation, which at least explains how they can be as they have to be combined in perception with the ' special sensibles,' allowed to be subjective? Or giving the question an expressly, instead of (with Kant) an implicitly, psychological form why