Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/23

 12 J. DEWEY : hence we have a subject consciousness, which is in a special sense Mind (the scope of mental science), and an object con- sciousness in which all other sentient beings participate, and which gives us the extended and material universe" (Tbid. % 669). It is, of course, still kept in view (which constitutes the logical superiority of Subjective Idealism over Realism) that " the object consciousness, which we call Externality, is still a mode of self in the most comprehensive sense " (p. 378). " Object experience is still conscious experience, that is Mind" (p. 2). I have quoted at this length because the above passages seem to me an admirable statement of a representative type of Subjective Idealism. The logic of the process seems to be as follows. It is recognised that all existence with which philosophy or any- thing else has to do must be known existence that is, that all existence is for consciousness. If we examine this con- sciousness, we shall find it testifying to " two kinds of consciousness" one, a series of sensations, emotions and ideas, &c., the other, objects determined by spatial relations. We have to recognise then two parts in consciousness, a subject part, mind more strictly speaking, and an object part, commonly called the external world or matter. But it must not be forgotten that this after all is a part of my own being, my consciousness. The subject swallows up the object. But this subject, again, " segregates " itself into " two antithetical halves," into " two parts," the subject and the object. Then again the object vanishes into the subject, and again the subject divides itself. And for ever the process is kept up. Now the point I wish to make is that conscious- ness is here used in two entirely different senses, and that the apparent plausibility of the argument rests upon their confusion. There is consciousness in the broad sense, con- sciousness which includes subject and object ; and thcr consciousness in tin; narrow sense, in which it is equivalent to "mind," "Ego," that is, to the series of conscious states. The whole validity of the argument rests, of course, upon the supposition that ultimately these two are just the same that it is the individual consciousness, the "7v/"," which differentiates itself into the "two kinds of consciousne subject and object. If not, " mind," as well as " matter "- the series of psychical states or events which constitute the Ego and are "the scope of mental science," as well as that in which all " sentient beings participate "- -is but an element in consciousness. If this be so, Subjective Idealism is abandoned and Absolute Idealism (to which I hardly need say this article has been constantly pointing) is assumed.