Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/193

 182 C. L. MORGAN : on a firm scientific footing the doctrine of the parallelism (or identity) of neuroses and psychoses, and if we can further prove the truth of biological evolution, then the doctrine of mental evolution will be tenable as an inevitable corollary. But to attempt to prove this doctrine by reference to a number of hypothetical motives and complex mental states is in my opinion likely to hinder rather than to advance the acceptance of the doctrine by all careful thinkers. Let us, therefore, I repeat, stick to the objective study of habits and activities, reflex, instinctive and intelligent, making use of ejective inferences as sparingly as possible. 15. This leads us to reconsider the current definitions of Reflex Action, Instinct and Intelligence, which involve as an essential the element of consciousness. I quote those given by Mr. Romanes in his Animal Intelli- gence and adhered to in his later Mental Evolution in Animals. "Reflex action is non-mental neuro-muscular adjustment, due to the inherited mechanism of the nervous system, which is formed to respond to particular and often recurring stimuli, by giving rise to particular move- ments of an adaptive though not of an intentional kind. " Instinct is reflex action, into which there is imported an element of ruiix-iousncss. The term is therefore a generic one, comprising all those faculties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the relation between means employed and end attained, but similarly p.-i-t'oniii'd under similar and frequently recurring circumstances by all the individuals of the same species. " Reason or intelligence is the faculty which is concerned, in the inten- tional adaptation of means to ends. It therefore implies the conscious knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, and may ! i-xciriscd in adaptation to circumstances novel alike to the experi- ence of the individual and to that of the species" (p. 17). 16. I begin by offering two general suggestions : (a) Would it not be well to avoid the introduction of the term reflex action into the definition of instinct ? It leads to a somewhat forced interpretation of that term. A reflex action is a direct response to a definite stimulus. Can we describe all instincts the migratory instincts of birds for example as reflex actions ? (b) Would it not also be well to avoid the introduction of the term reason as an alternative to intelligence. We seem scarcely to require such an alternative. And the term reason is at once suggestive of a controversy which is not suggested by the term intelligence. I am aware that, if I choose to define reason as the intentional analysis and synthesis of conceptions, that is nothing to Mr. Romanes, who prefers to use the term as synonymous with intelligence. But 1 am not advocating my own definition (which I only