Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/189

 178 C. L. MORGAN I have no right to assert or deny anything with reference to the so-called mind of animals ". This is, however, contrary to an almost universal belief. What are the justifications of our ejective procedure ? (a) The justification by resulis. We habitually act towards our four-footed friends as if they were conscious beings, with results which point to the correctness of our hypothesis. (6) The justification based on evolution. Animals have inherited brain-structures in many respects similar to those possessed by man ; and there is no reason for supposing that in them no psychoses run parallel, or are identical, with their neuroses. 11. We are thus justified in believing in the existence of intelligence or mind in animals. But we must steadily bear in mind the fact that it has to be interpreted not only by, but in terms of, human consciousness. It is impossible for us to divest ourselves of the complexity of human con- sciousness. I cannot here enter at length into the subject of this complexity. All agree that the difference between the civilised human mind and the mind of even the dog or the elephant is probably enormous. And yet it is in terms of this immensely complex mind that our ejective images of brute minds must be framed. The complexity is, no doubt, largely brought about by language. For while the brute has to be contented with the experience he inherits or individu- ally acquires, aided no doubt in some cases by a little judi- cious maternal teaching ; man, through language spoken and written, profits by the experience of his fellows and the recorded results of centuries of ever- widening experience and ever-deepening thought. It is through language that we live, as I have elsewhere tried to enforce (Springs of Conduct, chap, i.), to so large an extent in a world, not of sensations, nor of perceptions, but of complex general conceptions. All that enters the mind of man becomes at once clothed with human conceptions. As Emerson says, " Nature always wears the colours of the spirit". We may call this the " pathetic fallacy " ; but we cannot get rid of it. Every conception a man forms is impressed (1) with his humanity ; (2) with his personality ; and neither of these can he by any mrans get rid of. If, therefore, we speak of memory, sympathy, affection, revenge, &c., as mental qualities possessed by animals, we must remember that each of these is stamped with the human image and superscription, and bears our own indivi- dual mark.