Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/175

 J. DEWEY : II. The relation of Psychology to Philosophy now stands, I suppose, something like this : There is an absolute self- consciousness. The science of this is philosophy. This absolute self-consciousness manifests itself in the knowing and acting of individual men. The science of this manifesta- tion, a phenomenology, is psychology. The distinction is no longer concerned with man's being itself; it is a distinc- tion of treatment, of ways of looking at the same material. Before going to its positive consideration the following ques- tions may suggest the result we desire to reach. How does there come about this distinction between the " spiritual " and the "natural," between "freedom" and "necessity"? How does there come into our knowledge the notion of a distinction between the " absolute principle of self-conscious- ness " and " man coming to himself only by a long process of development out of the unconsciousness of a merely animal existence " ? Is this a distinction which falls outside the subject-matter of psychology, and which may therefore be used to determine it ; or is it one which has originated within psychological experience, and whose nature therefore, instead of being capable of fixing the character of psychology, must itself be determined ly psychology ? Furthermore, what is this distinction between the absolute self-consciousness and its manifestation in a being like man ? Is the absolute self- consciousness complete in itself, or does it involve this realisation and manifestation in a being like man ? If it is complete in itself, how can any philosophy which is limited to " this absolute principle of self-consciousness " face and solve the difficulties involved in its going beyond itself to manifest itself in self-consciousness ? This cannot be what is meant. The absolute self-consciousness must involve within itself, as organic member of its very being and activity, this manifestation and revelation. Its being must be this realisation and manifestation. Granted that this realisation and manifestation is an act not occurring in time, but eternally completed in the nature of the Absolute, and that it occurs only "partially" and "interruptedly" throur/k (not in) time, in a being like man, the fact none the less remains that philosophy, under any theory of its nature, can deal with this absolute self-consciousness only so far as it has par- tially and interruptedly realised itself in man. For man, as object of his philosophy, this Absolute has existence only so far as it has manifested itself in his conscious experience. To return to our questions : If the material of philosophy be the