Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/16

 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT. 5 and sensations as they exist. And this means simply that existence the only real existence is not for conscious- ness, but that consciousness comes about from it ; it makes no difference that one calls it sensations, and another the ' real existence ' of mind or matter. If one is anxious for a thing-in-itself in one's philosophy, this will be no objection. But we who are psychological, who believe in the relativity of knowledge, should we not make a halt before we declare a fundamental disparity between a thing as it is and a thing as it is known whether that thing be sensation or what not? As this point is fundamental, let me dwell upon it a little. All our knowledge originates from sensations. Very good. But what are these sensations ? Are they the sensations which we know : the classified related sensations : this smell, or this colour ? No, these are the results of knowledge. They too presuppose sensations as their origin. What about these original sensations? They existed before knowledge, and knowledge originated and was developed by their grouping themselves together. Now, waiving the point that know- ledge is precisely this grouping together arid that therefore to tell us that it originated from grouping sensations is a good deal like telling us that knowledge originated knowledge, that experience is the result of experience, I must inquire again what these sensations are. And I can see but this simple alternative : either they are known, are, from the first, elements in knowledge, and hence cannot be used to account for the origin of knowledge ; or they are not, and, what is more to the point, they never can be. As soon as they are known, they cease to be the pure sensation we are after and become an element in experience, of knowledge. The conclusion of the matter is, that sensations which can be used to account for the origin of knowledge or experience, are sensations which cannot be known, are things-in-them- selves which are not relative to consciousness. I do not here say that there are not such : I only say that, if there are, we have given up our psychological standpoint and have become ' ontologists ' of the most pronounced character. But the confusion is deeply rooted, and I cannot hope that I have yet shown that any attempt to show the origin of knowledge or of conscious experience, presupposes a division between things as they are for knowledge or experience and as they are in themselves, and is therefore non-psychological in character. I shall be told that I am making the whole difficulty for myself ; that I persist in taking the standpoint of an adult whose experience is already formed ; that I must