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 138 NEW BOOKS. applicable) is really in contradiction with the doctrine of the all-wise Unconscious, and has to be brought into Hartmann's sy.-tem on empirical grounds. It is these empirical grounds that the author sets himself to investigate. While making many criticisms of detail on Hartmann's attempted proof that tin-re is a balance of pain in the world, he directs the chief force of his attack against the application of the eudaemonistie measure to the worth of life. Xo strictly quantitative comparison of pleasures and pains such as Hartmann attempts is practicable; and even if it were possible to measure feelings in the way proposed, this would not decide the question whether existence is preferable to non-existence. The fundamental error of pessimism is that it regards happiness as the only rational end of the process of things. Not all forms of happiness indif- ferently need be in causal relation to the principle of things, but only that happiness which is in itself rational because it proceeds from "the moral mil". For the production of the moral will a process of development is required, of which pain forms part. The feeling of happiness in which attainment of the rational end manifests itself is accompanied by indif- ference to the pleasures and pains that proceed from external causes. This was recognised by the ancient moralists of all schools, who placed happi- ness in an internal state. Hartmann himself makes such an internal state the ethical end of his pessimism. The pessimistic renunciation of the search for happiness in external objects, the identification of the ends of the individual with those of the Unconscious, results in a state of the moral agent by which he is raised above all particular pleasures and pains. The possibility of the attainment of this state makes the euda-numistic measure inapplicable, and thus ethical pessimism is sufficient in itself to destroy the pessimistic conclusions. Emil Du Bois-Rpymond. Eine Kritik seiner Weltansicht. Von THEODOR VEBER. Gotha : F. A. Perthes, 1885. Pp. x., 2(>L This criticism of what seeuis to the author the thorough-going and con- .-equent materialism of Du Bois-Reyniond's view of the world lias for its ultimate aim to Christianise science". Especially, he seeks to refute Du Boifl-Beymond'a "ever returning affirmation that where supernaturali>ni begins science ends". The great detect of Du Boi.s-Reyinond's view is found to be "the arbitrary assumption of the eternity of primitive atom> ". The true conception of nature is that of a "real principle," at first  in- different," but capable of becoming "atomised. Nature, thus known as it really is, leads the way directly to God as its creai Die Lehre Htrbarts von der m'"/<*/< //'ter, ls<:>.

Pp. viii., 74. The object of this book is to give such a condensed exposition of Hi :- bart ; s psychological conceptions as may prepare for the understanding of his pedagogics. The text is entirely in Herhart's own words ; only the .-election of extracts and the arrangement of the paragraphs being the, autho Die Lchre vom /?'.<// Jr.-. 1 ffV(n'sx/-//x in ti limiil'rt*. Kin lieitrag /.ur (Jeschichte der Kthik. ErMer Tlieil : Die Fi-aiici.-caner.-chule. Yon Dr. Urn. TiiKoi'ini. SIMAK, Professor der Katholischcn Theoloje an der I'niversitat xu IJonn. Freiliui-g i. B. : Eerier, L886. Pp. 32. The author proposes in the procnt work to give an account of the Schola.-tic doctrine of the conscience that shall do justice to the minor