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 B. BOSANQUET, KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY. 95 makes it not always easy to lay hold at once on the essential and subordinate to it what is really matter of detail. This initial difficulty once surmounted, however, and the meaning and connexion of the various parts once apprehended, the discussion is invariably found to be original, careful and coherent. The chief part of Mr. Bradley's work and of Mr. Bosanquet's criticism is the doctrine of Judgment. The traditional view itself recognises this as the citadel of the situation ; if reconstruction is necessary here, it is necessary throughout. Now Judgment, according to Mr. Bradley, is not as traditionally conceived the connexion of two ideas, whether in extensive or intensive quantity ; but the reference of an idea (predicate) to Reality (the constant subject). This reference to Reality is of the utmost importance in Mr. Bradley's work, and it is the feature in it against which Mr. Bosanquet's criticism is chiefly directed. ' The ultimate subject in judgment ' is always the Real, which is found in perception, while it is ' for us an ideal construction '. It is in this view of Reality that Mr. Bosanquet detects the saddest want of "thoroughness". "You cannot at once treat reality as ideal construction, and demand from it characteristics approaching to those of presence in the sensible series." Such an " anti-monistic attitude " or " bias" he maintains, is unworthy of Mr. Bradley. " Only a rich man may wear a bad coat, and only a philosopher of Mr. Bradley's force could escape suspicions of a crude dualistic realism when he writes as follows : ' It may come from a failure in my metaphysics, or from a weakness of the flesh that continues to blind me ; but the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. That the glory of the world in the end is appearance, leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour ; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories. Though dragged to such conclusions, we can- not embrace them. Our principles may be true, but they are not reality ' " (p. 18). Mr. Bosanquet protests against this "baleful en- chantment," this " dream which . . . seems never to lose its maleficent spell ". " Surely the more glorious reality," he says, " is that which our vision and our will can make of the world in which we are ; and the certain frustration of all such achievement is to relax the toilsome grasp which holds real and ideal in one " (p, 20). Again : "I may observe in reference to his entire posi- tion that the distinction between reality and the discursive movement of the intellect appears to me to be for us a distinction n-ifhin the intellectual world " (note, p. 19). Mr. Bosanquet explains that he suspects he must have misunderstood Mr. Bradley here, as he cannot suppose him actually to hold any such view as that de- scribed above. But probably this line of thought is more conscious and fundamental in Mr. Bradley than his critic supposes. Nor is