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 VII. CBITICAL NOTICES. Knowledge and Reality : A Criticism of Mr. F. H. Bradley's Principles of Logic,. By BEENAED BOSANQUET, M.A., late Fellow and Tutor of University College, Oxford. London : Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. Pp. xi. 333. In the Preface to this book, Mr. Bosanquet speaks of the Principles of Logic as " a work which deserves to be epoch-making in English philosophy''. Nor can this high claim be well denied, if the attempt to bring to bear upon a science a radically new conception of its nature, and to re-adjust its content in the light of this, is entitled to the name of " epoch-making ". For Mr. Bradley's treatment of Logic amounts to no less than this. His work may fairly be described as an attempted reconstruction of logical doctrine in view of the achievements of Idealism. Very little of the old traditional Logic can stand the searching blaze of that fierce light ; but, according to Mr. Bosanquet, the work of reconstruction is not radical enough. There are still parts of the old fabric left standing, though their foundation is under- mined; and the object of this "Criticism" is to complete Mr. Bradley's work both in its negative and in its positive aspects, in the destruction of the old an 1 in the substitution of a more adequate view. It is a certain " deficiency in philosophical thoroughness " which, according to Mr. Bosanquet, Mr. Bradley shares with " the writers of the German reaction," and which he would remedy by exhibiting the necessary consequences of Mr. Bradley's principles. " It is my object," he says, " in the following pages to show how Mr. Bradley's essential and original COIK tions might be disengaged from some peculiarities which he apparently shares with reactionary Logic." In the main, then, the critic agrees with his author ; and his object throughout is evidently not only to point out defects in the Pr!>/<- :/,!,.< of Logic, but quite as much to emphasise and carry home the greatness of the advance made in that work upon the standpoint of traditional logic. At times, indeed, Mr. Bosanquet's criticism may seem a little fine, especially in the discussion of details whose essential connexion with the main standpoint of his book it is occasionally difficult to see. Perhaps, however, this is a hardly avoidable accompaniment of that ' ' thoroughness " in following out the consequences of a point of view which he desiderates as the one thing wanting in Mr. Bradley's work, and which is certainly the characteristic of his own. It must be added that the difficulty of the Principle* f Logic is rather increased than otherwise in this exposition and criticism ; and one feels occasionally that the difficulty is not altogether inherent in the subject, but is the result of a certain want of perspective in the treatment, which