Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/73

 PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 59 distinguishing in thought, and therefore also naming, new objects. For instance : in France, and following its example in the German Empire, official statistics has found it necessary, in order to distinguish the more dense popula- tions from the less dense, to group together districts of 2000 and more inhabitants, although these form a unity neither administratively nor according to their use of language ; but because in both respects similar distinctions are certainly noted, allowance is made for these by calling the one group an "urban district" the other a "rural district". If this simple rule were universally carried out something would be gained, which would serve as an example for scientific ends. In all languages town and country are distinguished, some- times only with an indefinite idea of the magnitude of places, but sometimes the name town has a positive historical, i.e. legal basis. This runs across differences of magnitude. In more modern times the legal signification of the concept town has receded very much into the background, and the distinctions of districts according to the number of their population have made themselves more and more free from it, while at the same time developing themselves more strongly. For statistics these distinctions have an elementary interest. It finds, e.g., that the more dense populations in- crease also more rapidly. If we desire to show this as town and country, whether the opposition is of language or admin- istrative, then we should have to register some densely popu- lated districts as country, some less densely as towns thus contradicting our own purpose. The results from different countries would certainly be entirely incomparable. The arbitrary, i.e. the most appropriate to its ends, construction of concepts is indispensable. The name is in itself indifferent ; but if the name "town" is retained then sufficient reasons can be given for this choice as for everything which attaches itself to existing associations. The concept town is itself ontological in our sense. Social " entities " need before all others such clear determination for scientific ends, especially such as right and religion, behind which it is customary to seek yet another entity, like a soul behind the skull. But that the scientific official determination of psychological con- cepts, to which the traditional names of sensation, feeling and will would be appropriate, would be less useful than that limitation of phenomena with respect to one another to which the old names of town and country are applied, does not seem probable. It may be said with reason that here we have to do with purely "external" attributes and con- cepts. Certainly ; but the way into the interior must always