Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/580

 566 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. least, a representative of this latter school. Zieschc (' Die Lehre von Materie und Form bei Bonaventnra ') shows the influence which Neo- platouic thought exercised on St. Bonaventure's theory as to matter and form. Dr. Gutberlet ('Zur Psychologie des Kindes (Schluss)') discusses Baldwin's theory of psychological development. Baldwin, while avoiding many of the arbitrary assumptions which disfigure the theories of Bain and Spencer, makes many arbitrary assumptions of his own. These assump- tions are very marked in his treatment of ' Accommodation,' ' Gewohn- heit,' etc., etc. But Baldwin must at least have credit for excluding the element of " chance " from his theory, and for so explaining the process of development as to leave room for the operation of a higher Power. According to Dr. Beck (' Die Lehre des hi. Hilarius von Poitiers (und Tertullian's) iiber die Entstehung der Seelen'), St. Hilary, while insisting that God is the principal author of man's origin, was of opinion that parents are the immediate cause of both the soul and the body of their offspring. Beasons for ascribing this opinion to St. Hilary are the occurrence in his writings of such statements as : " Man is born with soul and body through the agency of that nature which God has given to us," and the fact that in many other respects St. Hilary was a disciple of Tertullian, who undoubtedly maintained this opinion. Tertullian, how- ever, is guiltless of the very material account of the soul's origin that has sometimes been ascribed to him. Although St. Augustine has left no distinct treatise on sensitive knowledge, there are, as W. Ott maintains (' Des hi. Augustinus Lehre iiber die Sinneserkenntniss), references enough to this subject scattered through his writings to sufficiently indicate his mind. However different his terminology may be, his theory substantially agrees with that of the Scholastics. And, like the Scholas- tics, he contends that sense and intellect are separated by a chasm which cannot be bridged over. Bd. xiii., Heft 2. Geyser. 'Die erkenntnisstheoretische Grundlage des Wissens bei Cartesius.' [In this, the first of two articles, the writer expounds the foundations of Descartes' system, and his methodical doubt even of the first principles of reason. He then begins to point out the inconsistency of the Cogito ergo sum, which depends upon the principle : Who thinks cannot be non-existent so long as he thinks.] Engel-Kemper. 'Die Lehre Saadia Gaon's iiber die "Aufhebung des Gesetzes".' [This is also the first of two papers. It is a study on the Jew Saadia Gaon's great theological work, the Amdndt, written in Arabic: it contains a summary of the work, and a full translation of chapter iv. of tractate iii., which is one of the most remarkable in the whole work.] Ott. ' Des hi. Augustinus iiber die Sinneserkenntniss.' [Augustine seems to think that the soul is united to the body by means of the subtlest amongst the elements. His views as to the truth and reality of the knowledge we derive from the senses coincide with those of Plato.] Gutberlet. ' Zur Thierpsycho- logie.' [This paper, starting from the standpoint that brutes are neither intelligent beings nor mere machines, gives full details of the experi- ments recently made upon ants. The question is : Have ants anything more than reflex nervous activity ? The conclusion is that they have, but only sense-impressions, without anything of the higher qualities manifested by vertebrates.]