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 554 NEW BOOKS. Kant is said to place knowledge on a merely subjective basis : his ultimate synthetic judgments are " le rc'sultat d'une impulsion naturelle aveugle " (p. 182). And it is thought to be a relevant criticism of Kant's phenom- enalism to say that " si tout objet intelligible est tine fiction cle la pensee, la distance du roman & la science n'est elle point virtuellement sup- primee ? " (p. 334). In fact Kant is persistently interpreted in a merely psychological sense. H. BARKER. Introduction a la vie de I' esprit. Par LKON BRUNSCHVIGK, Professeur Jigrege 1 de philosophic au Lycee de Rouen. Paris : Felix Alcan. 1900. Pp. 175. It seems, since no ideal of progress can tolerate capitalism in mental wealth, highly necessary that all special research should be gradually incorporated in the common stock of knowledge. This task of popularisa- tion is everywhere hard, but especially so in the case of philosophy. Prof. Brunschvigk's little book has, therefore, some interest. It is an attempt, not unskilful, to make philosophy " accessible au grand public " ; and the author is to be congratulated on the clear style and careful arrangement which have made it possible to give in short compass a sketch of certain metaphysical questions. Complete success could not be expected in such an undertaking ; and the author sometimes succumbs to the difficulties of his attempt. The omission of all historical reference and the adoption of an abstractly individualistic starting-point do not really serve their purpose. Historical connexions must be supplied either by writer or reader ; otherwise positions of thought are often unintelligible. And the individualistic point of view is such ' a popular abstraction that, once admitted, it resists all reform. It is no doubt partly due to the brevity of treatment that many problems are unsatisfactorily concluded. For instance, it is shown that sensations giving contact with reality are not in themselves easily dis- tinguishable from mere imaginings ; but this distinction is afterwards assumed. Again, the formation of ' first universals ' is described under the misleading phrase, "fusion <!i'* imai/rx ". The developed judgment (even disjunction and syllogism) is wholly identified with the jndgmrnt of quantity. In one place a form of the quantitative judgment seems to be elicited from sensation, since it is said ' ccsont Its menu's e.rjn rlnu; .s :T (touch, sight, etc.) " qv/i fourtlintent la notion de grandeur ". The theory of art is vaguely handled. But there are good general remarks on the educative function of art, as regards the appreciation of Nature ; also on the disinterestedness of the aesthetic judgment, " >'n. suspendant t effort de reflesion et la lutte pour vivre ". In discussing morality and religion the author straggles as best he may to trans- form the common individualistic standpoint. The identification of the intelligible and the good, and the other unparalleled perplexities of the moral problem, commonly bring philosophers to such straits that per- haps we need not be startled at Prof. Brunschvigk's final desperate assertion : " Le mal etst vaincu, car le inal ezfste, pour ceux-la sevl* ijiii demandent aiu evfiiements la satisfaction de leurs desirs individiie/*". 3. A. J. DREWITT.