Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/567

 NKW Il(> '-//,;/, gtntrat, on 'i'h ./,. ,/, /,, (JtrtUudt I'ar D BUBOm. Paris: I'VIK Alran. IS'.i'.l. I',,. ,,.. ;;: | In this volume, which forms the first part of a comprehensive work on the theory of knowledge, the author investigates the nature and cond. of certainty in general, leaving for a second volume the InvMtigal the particular certainties which are fundamental in tin- various depart- ments of knowledge. It would naturally have been easier to appreciate the exact scope of the general investigation with thr : ,. ond part in view, and indeed the propriety of such a dhUi.m between the two parts is itself open to question. The present volume is divided int<i four books. The first is taken up with the-eneral definition of tin- terms Ol the problem. Apart from a distinction, not very clearly stated, and perhaps not capable of being so stated, between logical and metaphysical truth, this task of definition is well done. It is. in fact, one of the i. of the work, that the author continually reminds us that the prol.li-m relates, not at all to the mere existence of firm convictions upon our part, but to the validity or objectivity of the certainties we feel. The author then proceeds to accept and emphasise the distinction between abstract propositions or principles (" jugements de Cordr> i,i:,il " and propositions of fact, and, in accordance with the general plan of the work, the sideration of certainty in regard to the latter is relegated to the second volume, so that the distinction is evidently to be taken as final. The present part of the whole work thus resolves itself into an investigation into the conditions of the validity, as distinct from the mere existence, of intuitive principles. And this investigation, again, is subdivided into two parts or problems : h'rst, the conditions of the objectivity of the judgment as the assertion of a relation between terms ; and second, the realit or objective reference of the terms themselves again a division which is open to question. The second of these two problems is that of the reality of universals, and its discussion in book iv. presents nothing vcrv novel or interesting. The strength of the present volume lies in the discussion of the former problem in book iii., and in a preliminary discussion in book ii. of the proper attitude to be taken towards epistemological scepticism and dogmatism respectively. This preliminary discussion in particular is a very candid, careful, and interesting treatment of the question of mologieal assumptions. The main contention of book iii. is neu rather than positive. The author does not seek to show, as one would be apt to suppose from the not very happy title of the volume, that there is any single criterion to which all certainties can be referred. On the contrary, he argues very admirably that the certainty of knowledge cannot be derived from any external authority (as the " traditionalist " writers of his own Church would maintain), nor can it ultimately depend on a merely subjective assurance, nor finally can it be established by any indirect pro- cess of proof (Descartes); it must be derived from the objective evidence of the content known. But this objective evidence is apparently that of isolated intuitions. The most obvious weakness of the book is a persistent and rather irrelevant polemic which the author seems to feel himself ealli-d upon to undertake against Kant. The value of the polemic may be judged from a few of M. Mercier's statements. " II est plus vraisernblable," lie says, referring to an opposite view, " que le spectacle des consequences negatives auxquelles aboutissait la Critii/m- d> /" fiiton pure aura em-aye le philosophe allemand et Ini aura, apres coup, suggertf la pensee de sanver de la mine, par un expedient, les croyances pratiques dont le genre hmnain ne pent se passer et qui sent indispensables h son bonheur " pp. 1