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 552 NEW BOOKS. Les Philosophies negatives. Par ERNEST NAVILLE. Paris : Fulix Alcan, 1000. Pp. 263. In the Introduction M. Naville indicates his conception of philosophy and its method. The task of philosophy is to discover the ultimate unity of things, or the supreme principle by which the facts of experience can be explained. M. Naville seems to imply that the ultimate unity must necessarily be that of a single principle. The method of philosophy is simply the method of science in general the method of observation and hypothesis. But before the task of philosophical construction is under- taken it is advisable to examine certain theories, which, if accepted, would deter us from the attempt or make us abandon it in despair. Such theories are those of Scepticism and the Eclecticism which is only Scepticism in another form, of Positivism and Criticism, which limit all knowledge to the sphere of phenomena, of Traditionalism (scepticism in the interests of Revelation; and Mysticism, which deny the possibility of any rational metaphysic, and, finally, of Dualism, which refuses to entertain the notion of an ultimate reconciliation. In a series of essays, written in a clear, interesting, and popular way, M. Naville deals with these theories in turn, denning them, illustrating them from history, and suggesting their defects and incoherences. Perhaps the only essay that calls for particular notice is that on the Critical Philosophy, which is longer than the others and has a more special interest. To begin with, the inclusion of Kant among the " nega- tive philosophies" is questionable, more especially as M. Naville fully recognises the constructive aspect of Kant's philosophy. Of the various reasons advanced for this inclusion the principal seems to be the dualism or chasm which Kant is supposed to have opened up between science and morality, and here M. Naville seems to share in the misunderstandings and exaggerations which are frequent in connexion with this subject. Kant's distinction between ' scientific ' or theoretical knowledge and moral conviction is, after all, only the emphatic assertion of an obvious fact. " II faut," says M. Naville, " II faut une tension d'esprit continuelle pour se rappeler que les affirmations les plus positives en ce qui concerne le monde spirituel ont pour 1'autenr une certitude morale qui ne doit pas etre contesti-e, mais qui ne peut jamais se traduire en une certitude scientifique " (p. 176). But surely it needs no great " tension ifrx/irit " to remember that moral convictions are not the objects of a mathematical or physical demonstration. If one may judge from casual indications in this essay, M. Naville would seek to maintain in some form the method and conclusions of the old natural theology, and if that point of view be maintained it is naturally impossible to do full justice to Kant's thought. Nor can M. Naville's more special criticism of Kant's moral theory be said to be free from misunderstandings. Thus it is objected against Kant's ethical criterion that, e.g., a Corsican would make the duty of revenge universal. But, of course, it is not the private opinions merely of the Corsican, but his logical consistency, that is in question. Again, Kant is censured because he fails to derive moral obligation from the claim made upon us by a higher power, in other words, by a divine legislator. But it is useless to bring against an opponent a theory which he has expressly rejected. It should be said, however, that, whether or not one agrees with M. Naville's criticisms, the essay is written in a no less clear and interesting way than the others. H. BARKER.