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 42 F. H. BRADLEY: the activity of one side only the burden of proof should rest upon him. But, without entering here on these points, I wish very briefly to call attention to some difficulties which result from the view that we have no ideas of pleasure. This view considers that we have ideas only of that which was pleasant, but that its pleasantness is in no sense recalled in idea. The mutilated residue which actually is recalled may create a fresh reaction of pleasure or not, according to the conditions now present. And as the residue provokes, or does not provoke this reaction, it becomes or does not become what we commonly call an idea of pleasure. 1 This view seems a paradox and I think that it is certainly a mistake, the result of a previous error in principle, but on the other hand I do not see how its falsity could be actually demonstrated.' 2 It has however in its working to encounter,, it seems to me, the following difficulties. (1) The memory and thought of a past pleasure may in fact now on the whole be pleasant or be indifferent or be painful, while it yet may remain in each case the actual and positive idea of a past pleasure. 3 If indeed we consider what 1 1 may perhaps be allowed to mention that the reader will find this view stated in my Principles of Logic, pp. 408-10. 2 1 do not think that it is " almost impossible " to produce a conclusive instance of "purely affective memory" (Kibot, Psychologie des Senti- ments, p. 170). It seems to me that from the nature of the case such a a thing could not exist. The required abstraction cannot be made, and hence any proof or disproof of this kind seems out of the question. The issue must be decided in one way or the other according as one view or the other is found in the end to strain the facts more or less, when all the facts are considered. 'I am forced to dissent from much in the following passage from Dr. Stout with regard to association in the case of pleasure and pain. " In order to see that the law of contiguity does not apply to pleasure-pain as it applies to presentations, we have only to recall some very common ex- periences. The sight of food awakens pleasure before eating ; but after we have eaten to satiety it gives rise only to indifference or disgust. This is inexplicable by the law of contiguity. If the pleasure of eating became associated with the sight of food by repetition, it ought easily to be revived whenever we concentrate attention on a well-furnished dinner-table. The pleasure depends on the satisfaction of an appetite, and when the appetite has disappeared it disappears also, and cannot be revived by mere associa- tion " (Analytic Psychology, i., 271-72). On this I would remark first that the facts are not quite as Dr. Stout has described them, and in particular I would call attention to one point among others which he has here ignored. In the clear absence of appetite or in the clear presence also even of dis- gust, I still may remember that I was pleased. And an apparent fact of this kind is surely something to be reckoned with. And in the second place Dr. Stout's remarks seem to rest on the assumption that, wherever there is an association of which one member is present, the associated element must under all conditions come up, and perhaps even come up