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 A DEFENCE OF PHENOMENALISM IN PSYCHOLOGY. 41 add that, if Prof. Seth would throw the first view over wholly and entirely with all the false prejudices which be- long to it, and then without any arri&re pensde would commit himself to and would develop the second view, he would produce a work which, whether they agreed with it or not, would be of the highest interest and advantage to students of philosophy. 1 It is only for a false view then that phenomena consist merely of objects. The experienced contains in itself very much more than these. And it is the whole content of the experienced which, when regarded in a certain way, becomes a co-existence and succession of events and forms the subject- matter of Empirical psychology. I should like to append to this paper some remarks on a point which I have noticed already, the question, that is, as to whether there are ideas of pleasure and pain. And, since a separate question may be raised about pain, it is better for us here to confine our attention to pleasure. My object in what follows is not to attempt in passing the full discussion of a large subject, but to mention some diffi- culties which, so far as I have observed, have not been properly recognised. I shall say no more here on the strange paradox that I cannot attend to a pleasure, and the general doctrine that Association holds only between " ob- jects," I of course do not accept. I follow here the more established view, and judge that there is reason to think that Association holds everywhere. I think also that, if any one maintains the separation in a concrete product of the aspect of pleasure from the aspect of sensation, and asserts subject, pp. 168, 213. I should like to say once more here that the essence of the view which I adopt whether that is right or wrong is that feeling does give us a positive manifold content. 1 With the elimination of real causality from the course of things," Prof. Seth remarks, "the world is emptied of real meaning" (p. 125). But, without raising here any discussion as to the sense in which causality is to be taken, I should like to emphasise a question which Prof. Seth, it seems to me, too much ignores. If you eliminate something, as he seems only too ready to do, from the experienced world, have you not m fact banished it from the world altogether ? Is there in short any other world in which it could exist ? Since the above was written I have had the advantage of consulting Dr. Mellone's Philosophical Criticism, but I cannot see that his posi- tion is really in advance of that taken by Prof. Seth. It appears to me that what is true and what is false are still left standing side by side. But why the true view is not from the first laid down and without scruple worked out, while the false view is thrown aside, I am quite un- able to understand. But Dr. Mellone, I trust, will do this some day.