Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/540

 526 S. TOLVER PRESTON : to be finite in extent : while this cannot be said of Space. Hence, these considerations seem to constitute a decisive obstacle in the way of any attempt to accord Space a structure (or any endeavour to elude the most abstract idea possible). Prof. Clifford remarks additionally as follows: "But the question Does space contain a finite number of cubic miles, or an infinite number? is a perfectly intelligible and reasonable question which remains to be answered by ex- periment " (Lectures and Essays, vol. i., p. 153). Whatever may be thought of this, it may at any rate be desirable to remember that Space itself has never been available for experiments directly--has never been laid bare, so to speak. It appears that Space has at no time been exhibited in sample form. Supplement. On page 165 of the First Principles (fifth edition) is the following passage by Mr. Spencer, which seems to merit some critical comment : " That which we know as Space being thus shown, alike by its genesis and definition, to be purely relative, what are we to say of that which causes it ? Is there an absolute Space which relative Space in some sort represents?" (p. 165). As to the first sentence : " That which we know as Space being thus shown, alike by its genesis and definition, to be purely relative, what are we to say of that which causes it ? " (p. 165). Now, of course, Space is " relative " in the sense that all per- ceptions are related to the observer or reasoner. But as to the question : " What are we to say of that which causes it ? " (p. 165). This implies or might naturally lead a reader to infer that " that which causes " Space (the perception), is itself not Space, i.e., that something different from Space, by acting on consciousness, pro- duces the impression we call " Space ". Obviously, this is not demonstrable, even if it were imaginable. For Space relative (i.e., Space to consciousness) and the absolute existence, whence results the impression, may possibly be iden- tical, or one and the same in kind. For a relative and an absolute may conceivably be alike in some phase. For instance, a sphere, as perceived, may actually exist as a sphere absolutely (indepen- dently of any observer being there). This is something positive and definite. To fix the conception sharply on form or shape alone the conception of the "thing in itself" (or absolute entity) involves nothing more than a comparison, i.e., the sphere as it appears, and the something which produces the impression called " a sphere " may be identical in shape, or the two be connected by the ratio unity (so to speak). This is quite intelligible ; in fact it is impossible to imagine definitely what else could be J. 1 Author's first paper in MIND for April, 1900, may be fitly alluded to here.