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 452 w. CALDWELL: quences " ere he speak disparagingly of its " nature " !) from the time of Leibnitz to that of Schopenhauer has enabled us to do ; it is this that constitutes its permanent contribu- tion to the thought of humanity. " Before Kant l we were in Time ; now Time is in us," and so on with Space and Cause and Substance and the rest of the categories. Before the time of Kant our lives were construed as subjected to the limitations represented by these categories ; now we see that the whole idea of these points of view about things is drawn from our consciousness of our mental and physical activity. It is in the writings of Kant and Hegel, in particular, that we find that complete logical justification for considering the necessities and conditions of our active experience as part of the actual texture and nature of what men regard as reality for it is they alone who have shown conclusively that the activity of the subject and self or agent is implied in the bare existence of "external" reality. I am further of the opinion that it is only Schopenhauer 2 who has put in our hands that real statement (viz., that reality, WirMichkeit is through and through will not merely life but will) about the nature of reality which enables us to meet the objections of those who rightly refuse to stop at a definition of reality beginning (as do the usual epistemological or Kantian de- finitions of reality as " that ivhich is constituted into an intelligible system by the activity of a synthetic conscious- ness ") with a " that ivhich ". Reality is not merely that ivhich is related in definite and verifiable ways to my thought and my activity, to my experience ; reality is will, not blind will (as Schopenhauer seems at first to say) but will in any and all of its grades from inertia and gravity upwards through cohesion and chemical affinity and reflex and vital action (nutrition, reproduction) to intended or motived and moral action : reality is known to me directly in the activity of my own body and " will " (the " body " is simply objectified will, and the "mind" simply internalised will the 'first realisa- effects particularly that of opening the eyes of so many men all over the western world to a perception of the theoretic absurdity of mere materialism. 1 This is literally true so far as modern philosophy in Europe is concerned, though Indian philosophy had been free from the trammels of Time and Space for generations. 2 For two reasons if for no other. In him, above all other post-Kantian philosophers, do we find the ultimate origin and the complete proof of the ideas (1) that substantiality is through and through causality, and (2) that we cannot think of an " activity " in the outer world save in terms of the " activity " that constitutes our own lives.