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 430 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. As philosophers and psychologists they have taken account of psycho- logical and of external physical conditions : but they have neglected the physiological intermediaries.] Z. Radoslawow-Hadji-Denkow. ' Unter- suchungen u'ber das Gedachtniss fiir riiumliche Distanzen des Gesichts- sinnes.' [Survey of previous literature. Apparatus and method. Results : memory decreases with increase of time interval, its keenness being approximately proportional to the logarithm of the time. Factors making for individual differences are : eye-measurement ; practice ; the dependency of the liminal value upon the ideal and the absolute memory (the memory for a just noticeable difference, and the ability to cognise differences that transcend a certain magnitude, after the lapse of times of any length, respectively) ; the magnitude of the minimal change ; fluctuations of attention, periodicity of the memory function, secondary conditions accompanying a too short interval ; disposition, fatigue (as affecting the mean variation). Experiments with filled intervals (auditory or visual impressions, reading). Discussion of special points : eye-measurement ; the ideal and the absolute memory (the curve of actual memory limina is shown, very ingeniously, to lie between the curves of the ideal and the absolute memories, the former of which is never realised, and the latter only within limits and under conditions) ; practice ; associative relations and disturbances in reproduction ; the overestimatioii of the distance of comparison ; observation times ; repro- duction times. Theory : discussion of observation and reproduction, in the light of the experimental results. The betterment of memory under distraction, and its interpretation in terms of avoidance of fatigue ; the intermittent character of observation ; the part played by feeling in reproduction.] AKCHIV FUU SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. Bd. vi., Heft 1. A. Miiller. 'Die Metaphysik Teichmiillers.' [Expounds Teichmiiller's account of the concept of being. Teichmuller distinguishes two kinds of being : (1) Ideal being, which is represented by the copula "is" and answers the question " what ? " This ideal being has no temporal implications. (2) Real being, which is represented by the conjunction "that" and by the existential use of the verb " to be ". Temporal distinctions as expressed by grammatical tenses belong only to real being. Ideal being belongs to the object of consciousness as such. Real being belongs to psychical activities or processes. To complete the account of being we must consider the union of ideal and real being in conscious life. They are embraced and combined by the " ego ". To the ego, as such, belongs a third type of being, which is presupposed in ideal and real being. This is called by Teichmiiller " substantial being ". The article proceeds to give an interesting account of the way in which the ' ego " comes to the knowledge of " substantial beings " other than itself.] L. Goldschmidt ' Kant's "Widerlegung des Idealismus".' [Defends Kant's consistency in the two editions of the Kritik against Kuno Fischer.] E. Bullaty. ' Das Bewusstseinsproblem.' [The antithesis of a subjective inner and an ob- jective outer world is an antithesis which only exists in a consciousness that comprehends both. Both are phenomenal ; they are known only in contrast to each other, and derive their whole meaning from this con- trast.] Paul Natorp. ' Bericht u'ber deutsche Schriften zur Erkenntnis- theorie aus den Jahren 1896 bis 1898. [Deals especially with v. Hart- mann's Katefforienlehre.] VlERTKLJAHRSSCHRIFT FUR WlSSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIK. Eugen Posch. ' Ausgangspunkte zu einer Theorie der Zeitvorstelhmg.' Sech- ster Artikel. [Maintains the theory of time as merely subjective form.