Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/40

 III. A DEFENCE OF PHENOMENALISM IN PSYCHOLOGY. BY F. H. BRADLEY. THE object of this paper is to defend " phenomenalism " in psychology, and to defend it mainly hy endeavouring to fix its true sense, and by clearing this from mistakes and perver- sions. That phenomenalism is the one rational attitude in psychology I am as convinced as I am convinced that in metaphysics it is senseless. And phenomenalism^ I may here provisionally define as the confinement of one's atten- tion to events with their laws of co-existence and sequence. It involves the complete abjuration of any attempt to ask in psychology for ultimate truth or consistency, and it involves the adoption as relative truth of whatever serves best to explain the detailed course of facts or those particular ways in which things happen. And, though I am well aware that I have no right to speak for any one but myself, I believe that the great body of psychologists desires and is anxious to accept phenomenalism in this sense and to relegate other inquiries about the soul to metaphysics. For, if we do not accept phenomenalism, I can perceive but one alternative. There will be in principle no division at all between psy- chology and metaphysics. One will be unable, at least on any principle, to limit the scope of an inquiry into the nature of the soul, and to refuse to be distracted by never- ending discussion of first principles. However anxious a man may be to confine himself to the mere observation and explanation of psychical events, he will be liable at every point to objections based on the question as to ultimate truth. And apart from phenomenalism we have nothing to justify us if we refuse to answer and to defend ourselves on this ground ; while, if we do not refuse, the consequences at once are disastrous. You in particular may be sure that in metaphysics you have the truth, but then another man may not think so, and experience shows that the one probably will not convince the other. And the only reason, it seems to me, why things have gone as well as they have gone is