Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/362

 348 A. K. ROGRES :THE ABSOLUTE OF HEGELIANISM. that it is not the physical act which we have in mind, but rather the conscious experience as it enters, not into the physical, but into the spiritual meaning of the world. Now taking the act in this manner, as the expression of a conscious purpose, there are two ways of looking at it. In reality the act, through its physical expression, does enter into the meaning of the universe, and, for a knowledge of the world which should be at all adequate, this universal value would have to be recognised. But while this involves a whole of meaning, it is not a whole of expe.rie.nce ; there is the other aspect also to be kept in mind. The conscious action is itself a fact a limited piece of consciousness which is im- mediately aware of itself, and which, as such, excludes all the rest of the world. So far as its immediate consciousness goes, it may be aware of very little of its own meaning, and it certainly will not be aware of it completely. And taken in this way, it is not in any save the most vague and general sense the act of the universe, but rather of the particular individual of whose experience it is a part ; and other acts are the acts of other individuals. In this individual life- experience any act is subject to a psychological explanation, but the explanation only extends to the connexions of my acts within my life, and not within the universe as a whole. Once again, it is perfectly true that any act has in point of fact a universal value ; it has relations reaching beyond my life, beyond anything, even, that it is possible for me to foresee and intend. But the unity which makes this meaning possible is a unity of selves, to each of which its own acts belong, not a unity of experience. The act is also my act, involving a consciousness which is very limited as compared with the world entire, and as such it has no relation to any unity of experience which is coextensive with the world, and is open to no such explanation by reference to this as it is by reference to the exclusive individual conscious life of which it is a part. A conscious act is explained only in relation to the purpose which it consciously serves, and this is only possible in the case of a single stream of experience which is a real conscious whole ; if we try to apply it to a multitude of such streams of experience, or conscious selves, going along side by side, with no continuity of consciousness between them, and each to a great extent in complete ignor- ance even that these other selves exist, our explanation must obviously break down. And if any other explanation is available, let it be forthcoming.