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 282 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. by omitting the reservation " in so far as ". He forgets that men are never purely rational and he fails to see that coercion of non-rational tendencies is necessary in Border to secure a free field for reason.] E. Tardieu. ' L'Ennui : Etude psychologique.' [Discusses (1) the ennui that springs from satiety with special reference to the ennui of the rich and that distinctive of the inhabitants of large towns ; (2) the ennui arising from a sense of the nothingness of life.] L. Winiaraki. L'Energie sociale et ses mensurations.' [Reduces " social energy " to attraction (1) between living matter and inanimate nature : (2) between living beings inter se. Money supplies a standard for measuring all forms of this energy as manifested in human beings.] Revue Critique. G-. Belot. 'La Religion comme Principe sociologique.' [Deals with two articles in the Anni'i Sm-iologique for 1897-98, the one by Durkheim on the ' Definition des phenomenes religieux,' the other by Hubert and Maus in ' La nature et la fonction du sacrifice '.] REVUE N^o-Scoi>ASTiQUB. No. 22. J. Halleux (' Le probleme philosophique de 1'ordre social ') divides the various theories on the meta- physical foundation of the social order into the Christian, which bases the social order on a natural necessity of the moral order resting, in the last analysis, on the will of God ; the "contract" theory, originally pro- Eaunded by Epicurus, and advocated in modern times by Hobbes and ocke, but finding its chief defender in Rousseau, which represents the social order as a result of mere convention ; and the evolutionist, which regards the social order as an expression of the blind necessity of things. C. Plat ('La valeur morale de la science d'apres Socrate') maintains that " to convert men to virtue by means of knowledge " was the chief aim of Socrates. But by what kind of knowledge ? If Socrates appears at times as a pure moralist, or, in the words of Marbach and Khron, " a simple reformer of practical life," he appears at other times as a mere " speculator " who desires knowledge for its own sake. But Socrates was above all things a moralist, insists M. Plat. Even when he en- couraged to speculation his final intention was a moral one. It was not sufficient to set before the Athenians a high ideal of life. It was necessary to make them grasp this idea in all its beauty and majesty. But cultivated minds alone could so grasp it. But speculation is mind cul- ture. Hence the efforts of Socrates to promote speculation. C. Noel (' La conscience de 1'acte libre et les objections de M. Fouillee ') contends for the freedom of the will and replies to the arguments advanced in support of Determinism. D. Mercier (' Un eri d'alarme') defends Neo-scholasticism from the strictures which have recently been passed upon it by Prof. Billia of Turin. M. de Wulf ('La Syn these scolastique 'suite et fin) shows that Scolasticism is far removed from any system of Monism. Its Theodicea presents a personal God and establishes the fact of creation. Its metaphysic of contingent being is at once a moderate dynamism (act and potentia, matter and form, essence and existence) and a resolute defence of individualism. Its psychology is experimental, objective and spiritual. Its moral science and its logic borrow from its psychology their distinguishing characteristics. PSYCHOLOGIQUE (Cinquieme annee), 1899. This volume like its predecessors is edited by Dr. Binet, with the assistance of Dr. Beaunis and Prof. Th. Ribot, and it adds to the obligations under which students of psychology already lie towards these indefatigable workers in the field. They have once more given us a serviceable record of recent research and opinions as well as some some interesting original papers. The analysis of recent books and articles occupy less room than those