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 258 CRITICAL NOTICES: idealism be true, part at least of this assumption is a proved illusion ; the only environment in relation to which we can be sither active or passive will be a " social" environment of minds. Further, if the real world of minds should prove to be an anarchic realm of independent and conflicting purposes, both activity and passivity would no doubt be ultimate characteristics of it. But if, on the other hand, it is an orderly system manifesting the guidance of a single intelligence, as Prof. Ward seems to believe, then there are really no conflicting purposes and no real failures. In fact, there is no environment for an ultimate and universal mind to act against, and thus, if " God " is really all and mechanism nothing, "God" can be neither active nor passive. But, if the "consciousness of activity" can only arise from an illusory belief in an antagonism that does not really exist, is not activity after all, what Mr. Bradley calls it, " appearance " and not reality ? This difficulty is at any rate not to be met by the remark that " those who have such compunction about admitting mental activity, re- gard mental passivity as transparent fact ; and yet a very little reflexion might convince them that passivity involves activity ". There may be persons so thoughtless as to make this fatal admis- sion, but it is not against such criticism as theirs that the category of activity stands in need of defence. The question is not whether mind is ultimately active or ultimately passive, but whether " activity," in the sense in which we want it as a working concept in psychology, the sense in which we speak of being sometimes more, sometimes less, active, can be predicated of any ultimate reality without self-contradiction. But this is precisely one of those questions which idealists of the Leibnitz-Lotze type and those of us who have learned in another school have still to debate between ourselves. A. E. TAYLOR. The World and the Individual. First Series. " The Four His- torical Conceptions of Being." By Josiah Boyce, Ph.D., Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University (Aberdeen Gifford Lectures). New York : Macmillan, 1900. Pp. xiv., 588. DR. EOYCE has given us a treatise of the greatest value and interest. His lectures form one of the most thoughtful and original presentations of an Idealistic Philosophy that have ap- peared since the tide of opinion began to flow again towards Idealism. His system may be considered as based on Hegel, and as profoundly influenced by Mr. Bradley, but there is much in it which is distinctively his own, and which cannot fail to profit an attentive reader. Dr. Eoyce has the courage of his great master. " The central problem of our discussion," he announces in the first lecture, " will