Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/267

 JAMES WARD, Naturalism and Agnosticism. 253 In the main Prof. Ward seems to have discharged this part of his task satisfactorily. There can be no reply to the contention that the universal transformation of the world's energy into a useless kinetic form depends on two conditions, (1) that the sum total of the energy in the world is fixed and finite, and (2) that there are no agencies at work within the world by which the "downhill tendency " of energy to assume a useless form can be reversed. Now we have already seen that the first assumption is an arbitrary one, deriving no support from our knowledge of real fact ; and further, in the selective action characteristic of mind we certainly seem to have a power working in a direction contrary to the " downhill tendency " of unguided energy. So that the suggestion that the second law of thermodynamics may prove to be invalid for living organisms is deserving of the most serious consideration. But when Prof. Ward adds to these weighty arguments the further contention, " If the energy of the world is a finite quantity and the second law of thermodynamics valid, how is it that the said degradation and consequent icy stillness are not the fact? On these assumptions the universe can only last a finite time, and the ratio of finite time to infinite duration is strictly infinitesimal. The chances then are infinity to one in favour of the universe being at any given moment played out," he seems to fall into a paralogism. Supposing the energy of the universe to be a finite quantity, the chances are of course infinity to one against our being able to say precisely what that quantity is, or when it will be " played out " ; but the chance of the quantity being sufficient to carry on the universe up to the present is, for all I can see, at least as great as the chance against. The number of finite quantities greater than any assigned finite quantity is surely indefinite. Again it is not always clear what Prof. Ward regards as the alternative to belief in a " physical universe " of finite energy. On the whole he seems inclined to Lotze's view that the total energy of the world may vary indefinitely according to its "needs," a view which is of course tantamount to denying that the physical order is a " universe " at all, but is quite con- sistent with the belief that the total energy of that order at any given time is a finite quantity. At other times Prof. Ward uses language which would suggest rather that the " energy of the universe " may at a given moment be actually infinite. It may perhaps be owing to some defect in metaphysical insight, but I must confess that to me it appears by no means indifferent which of these alternatives should be preferred. The former has at least nothing, except presumptions which Prof. Ward has shown to be baseless, against it ; the latter lies open to all the weighty arguments of Aristotle against an infinitum actu, arguments which no amount of harping on the other side of the Kantian antinomies seems sufficient to dispel. I have spoken at such length of the first division of Dr. Ward's polemic against Naturalism that I have little space left in which