Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/251

 COMPARISON OF SOME VIEWS OF SPENCER AND KANT. 237 of forces, no resultant (phenomenal) transformation is possible in the impression received ? Absence of resistance to force (or yielding to motion freely) may under certain circumstances produce a distinct impression, although a negative one : and sometimes a void encountered unawares may act on consciousness more strongly than a rigid resistance. May this have some application on the question as to how the idea of the existence of Space is physically generated ? But while appreciating much of acknowledged excellence in Mr. Spencer's works : nevertheless the wording of the following proposition seems to contain an objectionable ambiguity, which it may be desirable to point out. Mr. Spencer says : " We are forced to the conclusion that the relations of co-existence ... as we know them, do not obtain beyond con- sciousness." (Principles of Psychology, vol. i., p. 223.) These final words " beyond consciousness " are ambiguous : they tend to imply beforehand that that which corresponds to any relation of co-existence is beyond consciousness ; whereas this is just the point the author wants to prove. It may be suggested that this disadvantageous ambiguity might have been avoided by some such slight change in the wording of the proposition as to the following (say) : " We are forced to the conclusion that the relations of co- existence . . . as we know them, do not obtain in the existences themselves ". The question here is Does the perceived relation of form or shape belong to the existence in itself; if so, the information sought in this particular research cannot be said to be " beyond consciousness ". To seek for anything that is " beyond conscious- ness " would be absurd evidently. It might very well be that a perception of form or shape might be identical with what actually exists : although we may have no absolute knowledge or proof that this is so. Mr. Spencer however seems to think he can demonstrate a negative about an absolute, viz., that an existence in itself has not form. It appears that Mr. Spencer thinks it justifiable to apply the same reasoning io perceptions as to forces, or to subject them to analogous laws. He argues that because a resultant force 1 differs from its components in value and direction, that therefore a re- sultant perception (due to an interaction between brain force and that coming from an existence in the universe) must have under- gone an analogous modification ; i.e. that the perception must be a "transfiguration" of what exists. But while a resultant force changes in value, it does not change in kind or quality. No proof here exists that a perception represents a change in kind or quality passed through : and yet Mr. Spencer makes this argument a basis for the sweeping proposition that every perception involves 1 See Principles of Psychology, vol. ii., p. 505 pp., etc.