Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/250

 236 S. TOLVEB PBESTON : This can only mean that what "we know as Space" is the "phenomenal order"; i.e., we can only view Space as a phe- nomenon, whatever concealed cause (" ontological order ") may be acting on our brain-consciousness to produce the effect called by us "Space". The Space we are conscious of is then not an absolute existence, according to the Principles of Psychology. But the previously quoted passage from the First Principles implied that Space was an absolute existence, in that Mr. Spencer says that by "the direct testimony of consciousness," space is shown to be " absolutely independent " of mind. This then looks like a contradiction in terms. In view of this, may it not be legitimate to regard Space as the "ontological order" itself; while no "phenomenal order" (dissimilar) exists? " Absolutes " are said to be inconceivable, or at least they cannot possibly be more than undefined conceptions. But does not Space as viewed by us come under this category ; it is undefined as a conception, a something, and yet not an entity in the ordinary sense, since it has none of the properties of an entity (or thing) usually so termed. Contrast with this Matter, which is clearly an entity; because Matter has definite properties or attributes, inertia, shape, elasticity, capacity to resist, etc. But where is the attribute of Space (which can justify its being called an existence) unless indeed Space have the indefinite attribute of infinity, or unless to be without shape be an attribute, the converse of the attribute of shape. But is not this indefiniteness favourable to ,the view that in the case of Space we have some appreciation of absolute existence ? All sense-impressions are known to result from physical inter- action between the brain and existences. We may say the brain alone, because all the senses terminate in the brain. Now this physical interaction may in some cases (for certain reasons, we may question if in all) produce a so-called transformation, " trans- figuration " or phenomenon. Thus colour, for instance, is the resultant of the interaction between vibratory motion and the brain-consciousness. This ends in a transformation or phenome- non, as we see that vibratory motion and colour are not identical : the " resultant " (so to speak) is like neither of the two component forces. We can certainly say now that where there is no physical Interaction of forces between a given existence and the brain- consciousness, there can be no transformed (" transfigured ") impression received. Colour, for instance, evidently could not be impressed on brain-consciousness without interaction of forces. Space we know (whether a phenomenon or an absolute) cannot be acted on by force, and can itself produce no physical action. Matter, on the other hand, can both act physically on the brain, and be acted on itself. So far we are within the regions of certainty. May then Space be truly a case of an absolute, appreciated as it actually is; because where there is no physical interaction