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 216 E- B. HALDANB : hauer, rises to our lips. The facts of life are too strong to admit of this school being in earnest with its conclusions. If its disciples were consistent, what they call logical thinking would have been for ever deposed in their eyes. For we should recognise in it, as in all other phenomena of experi- ence, no more than a transformed activity of the ultimate root and bearer of all phenomena the will. The point of view of psychology could find no justification in its necessi- ties. Pessimism and scepticism would mean the same thing in the end. But both Schopenhauer and Prof. Miinsterberg refuse to attempt to learn to swim before going into the water. It is only by assuming the validity of reasoning processes as a guide to truth that they get to the will at all. Schopenhauer went even farther than Prof. Miinsterberg does. For he explicitly takes refuge when confronting the practical aspects of life (e.g., book 4 of the World as Will and Idea) in reason, with its denial of the will to live, as the deliverer from the bondage of the will, and therefore as its superior. All this seems to point, not to the taking of the mental processes disclosed in introspection as the final form of the real, or as more than an aspect of it, but to the look- ing to what has sometimes been called intelligence and sometimes subject, as the ultimate expression of the real. This may not carry us very far. It may land us miles short of the adoption of the Hegelian logic. But it does what Prof. Miinsterberg and Schopenhauer cannot do for us, it enables us at least to attempt to give some rational explana- tion of the relationship to each other of the transformations which the special sciences have adopted, and some satisfac- tory grounds for them. It delivers us from scepticism with which we cannot be in earnest cannot do more than play. It affords a basis for the criticism of categories which seems to be wholly lacking to the disciples of the other great post- Kantian school. Perhaps the time may come when the recoil from the abstractness of Hegelianism will have spent itself. People may come to think that although they have done right in rejecting its apparent reduction to a " bloodless bullet " of categories of the concrete riches of a universe in which personality and moral activity are cardinal facts, they have done wrong in rejecting its warning that to build on any other foundation than that of reason is to build on shifting sand. A yet fuller view than that of Hegel may leave us less dissatisfied than he has left us with reflexion as a guide to the nature of ultimate reality. But if in the end we pass by Schopenhauer we shall be none the less grateful to him for having recalled us from a shadow world