Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/219

 III.-PROF. MUNSTERBERG AS CRITIC OF CATEGORIES. BY E. B. HALDANE. FROM the fountain head of Platonism there flowed a stream which became a great river the philosophy of Aristotle. From the fountain head of Kantianism there flowed two streams. The one of them which soonest attained great volume was the Hegelian philosophy. But the second became likewise a current of great power. The meaning of the teaching of Schopenhauer has been appreciated out of Germany only in recent years. But it is not yet diminish- ing either in volume or intensity. Of the Hegelian philosophy even those who owe most to it have been of late years ready to recognise that there is a sense in which its work requires to be done all over again. Its original language was uncouth and abstract. Every- thing seems to be there for him who has learned where and how to look. But the business of learning is a long and weary one, longer and wearier than it need have been. Nothing is less surprising than the reaction against Hegel- ianism which has arisen in an age in which every one is more or less in a hurry, and hates to be thought by his neighbours to be unpractical. It is, accordingly, not to be wondered at that the attempt had been made to rethink and rewrite much of what Hegel taught. Mr. T. H. Green and Mr. F. H. Bradley may be taken as men who have done this, each in bis own way. Hegel refused to have anything to do with Kant's attempt to break up the entirety of know- ledge into parts. Kant was for him too much under the domination of the methods of psychology to be a safe guide to the nature of the ultimately real, that into which all else can be analysed, while it cannot itself be expressed in terms of anything beyond. For Hegel there could be no separation of form from matter in experience, or of what was perceived from the act of perception itself. This act was for him one and indivisible, and so was its product. There could be no division, such as with Kant, into elements