Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/216

 202 EDWARD WESTEBMARCK : obligatory," and the denial of the one as well as of the other- is an expression of the same tendency to look upon the moral law as the sole fact of the moral consciousness. Even' Utilitarianism cannot consistently admit of anything in- different within the province of moral valuation, since two- opposite modes of conduct can hardly produce exactly the same sum of happiness. Since this repudiation of the " in- different ' ' is quite contrary to the morality of common' sense, which no ethical theory can afford to neglect, con- siderable ingenuity has been wasted on vain attempts to show that the " indifferent " is nothing but a. rude popular conception unable to keep its ground against a thorough- going examination. Prof. Ziegler ironically asks, 1 " Such outward matters as eating and drinking are surely morally indifferent. And yet is eating and drinking too much, is. spending too much time in outdoor exercise, is lounging idly about, morally indifferent ? Or, on the other hand, is it morally allowable or wholesome to reduce one's self and make one's self weak and ill by fasting, or to become a hypochondriac by continually staying indoors ? " This way of reasoning implies a confusion of quite different volitions. To admit that eating or drinking on a certain occasion are matters of indifference, surely does not involve that eating and drinking generally, or eating or drinking too much are matters of indifference. Mr. Bradley observes, 2 "It is right and a duty that the sphere of indifferent detail should exist. It is a duty that I should develop my nature by private choice therein. Therefore, because that is a duty, it is a duty not to make a duty of every detail ; and thus in every detail I have done my duty." This statement also involves a curious confusion of entirely different actions. It may be very true that it is a duty to recognise certain actions as indifferent. This is one thing by itself. But it is quite another thing to perform these actions. It has been maintained that th'e sphere of the indifferent forms the totality of " ought," that when the same end may be reached by a variety of means, an action may be in- different merely in relation to the choice of means, but not so far as regards the attainment of the end, hence only apparently indifferent. 3 "If it is my moral duty to go from one town to another," says Mr. Bradley, " and there are two- 1 Ziegler, loc. cit., p. 85. 2 Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 195, note '. 3 Simmel, loc. cit., vol. i., p. 35 sqq. Alexander, loc. cit., p. 50 ./'/. . Murray, loc. cit., p. 26 sqq. ; Bradley, loc. cit., p. 195 sq.