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 U1.MS.RKS ON THE PREDICATES OF MORAL JUDGMENTS. 201 whole of morality in the word " ought " identify the minimum and the maximum, but I fail to see that morality is better for this. Bather it is worse. The recognition of a " super- obligatory " does not lower the moral ideal ; on the contrary it raises it, or at any rate it makes it more possible to vindicate the moral law and to administer it justly. It is now-a-days a recognised principle in legislation that a law loses part of its importance if it cannot be strictly enforced. If the realisation of the highest moral ideal is commanded by a moral law, such a law will always remain a dead letter, and morality will gain nothing. Far above the anxious effort to fulfil the commandments of duty stands the free and lofty aspiration to live up to an ideal, which, unattainable as it may be, threatens neither with blame nor remorse him who fails to reach its summits. Does not experience show that those whose thoughts are constantly occupied with the pre- scriptions of duty are apt to become hard and intolerant ? Those who deny the existence of anything morally " praise- worthy " which is not a duty, are also generally liable to deny the existence of anything morally indifferent in the conduct of responsible beings. The " super-obligatory " and the " indifferent " have this in common that they are " ultra- 1 The bad reputation which the " super-obligatory " has obtained among moralists seems partly due to the wrong use made of it in the doctrine of opera supererogattva. This doctrine, the substance of which is not co- extensive with the Roman Catholic Church in a more or less developed form it is found in Judaism (Montefiore, Religion of the Ancient Hebrews, ?. 527 *</.), Muhammedanism (Koran, sura xi., v. 10 ; Sell, The Faith of slam, p. 220 <?.), Brahmanism (Wheeler, History of India, vol. ii., p. 475), degenerated Buddhism (The. Indo-Chinese Gleaner, vol. iii., pp. 150, 161, 164} is based on the ideas that by a good or meritorious deed a man has done more than his duty ; that a good deed stands in the same relation to a bad deed as a claim to a debt ; that the claim is made on the same person to whom the debt is due, viz., God, even though it be only by his mercy ; and that the debt consequently may be compensated by the claim ha the same way as the payment of a certain sum may compensate for a loss inflicted. This doctrine is particularly objectionable to the moral consciousness for this reason, that it, directly or indirectly, attaches badness or goodness to external acts rather than to mental states. Reparation implies compensation for a loss. The loss may be compensated by the bestowal of a corresponding advantage, but no reparation can be given for badness. Badness can only be forgiven, and moral forgiveness can be granted only on condition that the agent's mind has undergone a radical alteration for the better. It is true that this last point was not overlooked by the Catholic moralists, but even the most ardent apology cannot explain away the idea of reparation in the Catholic doctrine of the justification of man (cf. Manzoni, Osservazioni sulla Morale Cattolica (1887 J, p. 100). Penance consists of contrition, confession, and satisfac- tion, and contrition itself is chiefly " a willingness to compensate " ( The Cati ('!i!*m of the Council of Trent, pt. ii., ch. v., qu. xxii).