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 HIM ARKS ON THE PREDICATES OF MORAL JUDGMENTS. 195 On the other hand, it involves no confusion of ethical con- ceptions to attribute " goodness " to the performance of a duty, or, in other words, to praise a man for an act for the omission of which he would have incurred blame. To say of one and the same act that it is right and that it is good, really means that we look upon it from different points of view. Since moral praise expresses a benevolent attitude of mind, it is commendable and even obligatory for a man not to !> too niggard in his acknowledgment of other people's right conduct, whereas, as self-praise is objectionable, only the other point of view is deemed proper when he passes a judgment upon himself. He may say, without incurring censure, " I have done my duty," but hardly, " I have done a good deed," and it would be particularly obnoxious to say, "I am a good man". The best man even refuses to be called good by others "Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is God ". Whilst "goodness" is the general expression for moral praise, virtue denotes a disposition of mind which is characterised by some special kind of goodness. He who is habitually temperate possesses the virtue of temperance, he who is habitually just the virtue of justice. And even when a man is simply said to be "virtuous," this epithet is given to him, more or less distinctly, with reference to some branch of goodness which constitutes his virtue. A Supreme Being, to whom is attributed perfect goodness, is not called virtuous but good. It was the opinion of Aristotle that virtue is imperfect so long as the agent cannot do the virtuous action without a conflict of impulses. Others maintain, on the contrary, that virtue essentially expresses effort, resistance, and conquest. It has been represented as "mediation through pain"; 1 according to Kant, it is " the moral disposition in struggle". For my own part I cannot admit that virtue presupposes struggle, nor that it is lessened by being exercised with little or no effort. A virtue consists in the disposition to will or not to will acts of a certain kind, and is by no means reduced by the fact that no rival impulses make themselves felt. It is true that by struggle and conquest a man may display more virtue, viz., the virtue of self-restraint in addition to the virtue gained by it. The vigorous and successful con- test against temptation constitutes a virtue by itself. Thus the quality of mind which is exhibited in a habitual and victorious effort to conquer strong sexual passions is a virtue 1 Laurie, Ethica, p. '253 sqq