Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/192

 178 J- ELLIS MCTAGGABT : the ground that it gives pain to the heretics who are burned, and another may approve of it on the ground that it gives pleasure to the orthodox who look on. But there can only be one way of acquiescing in the whole nature of any one thing, and only one way, therefore, of acquiescing in the whole nature of everything, and the ground of differentiation is wanting. The only form of consciousness which remains is emotion. And if the consciousness of harmony takes this form, I do not see that the same objections apply as with the other two forms. Perfect knowledge of C must be the same in A and B. Perfect acquiescence in C must be the same in A and B. So much is sure. But I cannot find any reason why perfect love of C should not be different in A and B should not be the differentiation required to make A and B perfect individuals. One might, perhaps, even go farther, and say that we find in emotion positive traces of this characteristic. But, since this is not a question for pure thought, I do not wish to consider it further here. We are thus led by two converging lines of argument to the same conclusion. Any adequate example of the Absolute Idea had to be such that there was an absolute balance between the individual for which all reality existed, and the reality which was for it neither being subordinated to the other, and the harmony being immediate. And, again, any adequate example of the Absolute Idea had to be such that each individual's separate and distinct nature had to be found in its connexion with other individuals. The example must be within consciousness, if it is anywhere. Cognition and Volition failed according to both tests. Emotion may be held to be more successful. This, at any rate, I think we are justified in concluding either absolute reality be- comes explicit for us in emotion, or it does not become explicit for us at all. What Hegel's own opinion on this question was, seems rather doubtful. It is, I think, almost certain, for the reasons given above, that he regarded the Absolute Idea as realised in consciousness. And, if we confine ourselves to the Logic, there would be good reasons for supposing that the form of consciousness which did this was emotion. For the categories of Cognition and Volition are each demon- strated to be imperfect, and to require to be synthesised before the Absolute Idea is reached. This seems to show that it is not knowledge or Volition which can be taken as such an adequate manifestation, and what can remain but emotion ?