Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/187

 HEGEL'S TBEATMENT OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE IDEA. 173 those who have accepted idealism who would be inclined to accept, either in a right or a wrong sense, any of the later categories of the dialectic, it would seem that it is safer to speak of the individuals than of the unity, if either expression is to be used exclusively. If, however, we say that the individuals are for each individuals, the question arises whether we can properly say that each individual is for itself. We found reason to believe that nothing could be for the unity, because the unity had nothing outside it. And it would seem that, on the same principle, we ought to deny that an individual can be for itself, since it is not outside itself. But this, I think, is erroneous. Each individual is not isolated, but part of a complete unity with other individuals which are outside itself. Its whole nature lies in the fact that it is a part of the unity that is its whole nature lies in something which is as much outside itself as in itself. And that being so there seems no difficulty in saying that for each individual there exist, not only other individuals, but also itself. An isolated individual could not be for itself, but then an isolated individual could not exist. All this would not apply to the unity, which is, by its definition, a self-contained unity, and has no relations with outside reality, since there is no reality outside it. The nature of each individual is, then, that all individuals are for it. Its nature thus depends on their natures. But the nature of each of them is the same. Thus the ultimate nature of each is that its similarity to the others is present to itself in more concrete form, that it is conscious of its harmony with each of the others. The view we have here taken of the Absolute Idea appears to be borne out by Hegel's own language. He does not treat the positive nature of that idea at any great length, but he does give a definition of it. In the Smaller Logic the definition runs as follows: "Die Idee als Einheit der subjektiven und der objektiven Idee ist der Begriff der Idee, dem die Idee als solche der Gegenstand, dem das Objekt sie ist ; ein Objekt in welches alle Bestimmungen zusammenge- gangen sind. Diese Einheit ist hiermit die absolute mid alle Wahrheit, die sich selbst denkende Idee, und zwar hier als denkende, als logische Idee" (Enc., section 236). What Hegel means by saying that the Idea is the Notion of the Idea, I must confess myself unable to understand. The Idea is, according to him, itself a variety of the Notion. But that the Idea is Gegenstand and Objekt to itself (or to its own Notion), seems a clear indication that reality is for