Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/184

 170 J. ELLIS MCTAGGABT: Hegel's own opinions, but one which he himself makes inevitable. We now come to THE ABSOLUTE IDEA, the final category of the whole process. It is, as I men- tioned above, identical with the third stage of Cognition in its meaning. Reality is a differentiated unity, in which the unity has no meaning but the differentiations, and the differentiations have no meaning but the unity. The differentiations are individuals for each of whom the unity exists, and whose whole nature consists in the fact that the unity is for them, as the whole nature of the unity consists in the fact that it is for the individuals. And, finally, is this harmony between the unity and the individuals neither side is subordinated to the other, but the harmony is an immediate and ultimate fact. This, according to Hegel, is the absolute truth, so far as it can be reached by pure thought. There are, he asserts, no contradictions to be found in this conception which compel us to proceed to a higher category to remove them. There is, indeed, one contradiction, or rather imperfection, which reveals itself here, as in every other case where pure thought is taken in abstraction from the other elements of reality, and by means of which Hegel's philosophy is driven on from the Logic to the conception of nature, and from that to the final and supreme reality of Spirit. But with the Absolute Idea we reach the highest and final form of pure thought. The proof that this is the final form of pure thought must always remain negative. The reason why each previous category of the Logic was pronounced not to be final was that some contradiction was discovered in it, which com- pelled us to go beyond it. The finality of this category rests, on our inability to find such a contradiction. Hegel's asser- tion that it is the absolutely adequate expression of reality (in so far as pure thought can be an expression of reality) will hold good unless some more acute thinker shall discover some contradiction in it which requires and admits of removal by means of another category. The Absolute Idea must now be considered in detail. The most interesting questions, however, which relate to it, are beyond our present purpose. These relate to the conclusions which we can draw from its nature with regard to the Philo- sophy of Religion. Such matters fall outside the sphere of