Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/176

 162 J. ELLIS MCTAGGABT : ledge, we condemn the knowledge as being incorrect ; and we endeavour to amend it by altering our ideas till they accord with the objects outside them. But with volition it is just the reverse. Here we condemn the outside reality which does not accord with our desires, and we endeavour to restore harmony by altering the objects so that they may be as we desire them. Thus in knowledge the aim of the knowing subject is to reproduce in itself the state of the world at large. Of course this does not imply that the mind is purely passive in the process, and has nothing to do but receive effects from outside. The question is not about the way the results are produced, but about the test of them when they are pro- duced. However active the mind may be in producing knowledge, the fact that it is knowledge which is produced implies that there is a reality. This being the case, it is natural that the first stage of Cognition should be held to find its only adequate example in knowledge, and should be called Cognition par excellence. We must, of course, remember here, as with the wider category, that we have not deduced, and have no right to assume all the concrete characteristics of knowledge, but only the abstract category of pure thought which knowledge exhibits. Another point to be remembered is that only perfect know- ledge could manifest this category. The whole nature of the unity has to be exhibited in the individual, and the whole nature of the individual has to consist in exhibiting this unity. Accordingly, if we look at an actual knowing individual such as each of us is we find that his nature differs from the pattern set by the category in two points. It is not large enough, and too large. On the one hand, none of us knows everything, and therefore none of us can know anything quite perfectly. And, on the other hand, none of us are merely knowing beings. Knowledge is but one side of our nature. I shall venture to omit Hegel's division of Cognition Proper into analytic and synthetic knowledge. In the first place these divisions only apply to knowledge while it is yet imperfect. In perfect knowledge the distinction, as Hegel draws it, would cease to exist. And as the category which we are considering is only manifested in perfect knowledge, the distinction between analytic and synthetic appears in- appropriate to the dialectic, however relevant it might be if we were discussing the nature of knowledge itself. And, in the second place, all Hegel's detailed treatment of these